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SINCERITY AND REASON-GIVING: WHEN MAY
LEGAL DECISION MAKERS LIE?
Mathilde Cohen*

INTRODUCTION

The lawfulness of state actors' decisions frequently depends on the
reasons they give to justify their conduct, and a wide range of statutory and constitutional law renders otherwise lawful actions unlawful
if they are not justified by reasons or are justified by the wrong reasons.1 A question that arises is whether sincerity in reason-giving is
also-and should be-required. In other words, when public officials
are under a duty to give reasons for their decisions, are they also
under a duty to give sincere reasons? That is, do they have the duty to
state their actual motives as their reasons?
In law, and often elsewhere, sincerity seems to be both the usual
expectation and the ideal that regulates discursive practices and exchanges. 2 A series of legal mechanisms direct members of the Execu* Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School; Research Fellow, CNRS, Centre de Th6orie et
d'Analyse du Droit; J.S.D., LLM, Columbia Law School; LL.B., Sorbonne; M.A., B.A., Sorbonne and tcole Normale Sup6rieure. For this work, I received generous financial support from
the Fondation des Treilles. A version of this Article was presented at the Festival of Legal
Theory, Arts & Humanities Research Council Doctoral Colloquium at the University of Edinburgh in May 2008, and at the Columbia Law School Associates' Workshop in November 2008; 1
am grateful for the comments I received on both occasions. I would also like to thank, for their
suggestions and criticisms, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Noa Ben-Asher, Lenni Benson, Samuel Bray,
Emmanuelle Caucci, Jon Elster, Robert Ferguson, Kent Greenawalt, Ori Herstein, Joseph Landau, Tanusri Prasanna, Joseph Raz, Jessica Roberts, Jacqueline Ross, Tali Schaefer, Micah
Schwartzman, and Michel Troper.
1. This is typically the case with judicial review of administrative agencies. The established
rule, formulated in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943), is that a reviewing court may
uphold an agency's action only on the grounds upon which the agency relied when it acted:
"[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in
exercising its powers were those upon which its actions can be sustained."
2. The existence of causes of action such as fraud, misrepresentation, or libel in the common
law seems to indicate the significance of sincerity, even if it would be much harder to point to a
cause of action whose specific function was to remedy damages caused by insincerity. In this
respect, citizens might be better protected against insincerity in their private dealings than citizens as members of the public because legal systems usually include a device for creating and
bolstering loyalty between private parties: fiduciary duty. The imposition of a duty of loyalty on
the fiduciary is constructed as a "prophylactic rule intended to remove all incentive to breachnot simply to compensate for damages in the event of a breach." ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 996 (1983).
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tive, 3 including the President, 4 to reveal their views transparently
when announcing to the public vital decisions such as that of going to
war or that of adopting major new economic policies. They are expected to disclose facts and arguments supporting their action in
which they sincerely believe. 5 Similarly, when settling disputes or determining the optimal legal rule to address a specific issue, judges are
expected to believe what they say in their opinions. 6 Likewise, administrators who decide whether a citizen is entitled to social security disability benefits or to a liquor license are legally required to give
sincere reasons for their determinations.7 Legislators too, when called
upon to justify a piece of legislation, are expected to truthfully report
8
the motives that prompted them to legislate.
This conventional picture, however, may be mistaken. Within the
law itself, reason-giving devoid of sincerity is more prevalent than
might seem apparent. In a variety of legal contexts, the lack of sincere
reasons is no obstacle to the legal validity of a decision. For instance,

3. On our expectations of sincerity in political discourse and deliberation, see generally ELIZABETH MARKOVITS, THE POLITICS OF SINCERITY:

PLATO, FRANK SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC

(2008).
4. On the recent polemic concerning the Bush Administration's efforts to withhold information from public access, see Patrice McDermott, Withhold and Control: Information in the Bush
Administration, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 671 (2003); Gregg Sangillo, Incarceration of
Information?, NAT'L. J., Oct. 23, 2004, at 3227-28. But see Jonathan Turley, ParadiseLost: The
Clinton Administration and the Erosion of the Executive Privilege, 60 MD. L. REV. 205, 205-07
(2001) (showing that secrecy was already a mark of the Clinton presidency).
5. On the emergence of openness and disclosure as key concepts of governance in the past
decade, see Thomas Blanton, The World's Right to Know, FOREIGN POL'Y, July 2002, at 50.
6. On judges' legal duty to give candid and honest reasons, see generally David L. Shapiro, In
Defense of Judicial Candor,100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (arguing that candor "is the sine
qua non of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing about
them and to say another").
7. The iconic statement of the position according to which administrators must give transparent reasons is found in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The
Overton Court noted that "'post hoc' rationalizations.., have traditionally been found to be an
inadequate basis for review." Id. at 419. The Court continued,
[S]ince the bare record may not disclose the factors that were considered or the Secretary's construction of the evidence it may be necessary for the District Court to require
some explanation in order to determine if the Secretary acted within the scope of his
authority and if the Secretary's action was justifiable under the applicable standard.
The court may require the administrative officials who participated in the decision to
give testimony explaining their action.
Id. at 420.
8. On the problem of legislative motivation, see Paul Brest's seminal article, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT.
JUDGMENT

REV. 95.
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save in special constitutional contexts, 9 the legislature need not give

any reasons at all for its actions, and when it volunteers reasons, we
know that those reasons are artificial constructions attributed to a
metaphorical "it" that is really a "they."1 0 Similarly, courts routinely
uphold decisions by legislators or lower courts which were originally
accompanied by false or seriously misleading statements on grounds
other than those stated." In these scenarios, the underlying premise
is that if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, even
though the public official gave a wrong or insincere reason. Another
illustration is that police officers making arrests need not necessarily
believe that the considerations they cite show probable cause.' 2 In
short, many decision-making environments eschew sincerity in reasongiving.
These examples show that despite its presumptive appeal, the idea
that public officials must adhere to a norm of sincerity is not universally conceded. For instance, does the sincerity of a prosecutor's rea9. See J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and FundamentalRights in ConstitutionalLaw,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978) (arguing that when equal protection or "fundamental rights"
such as freedom of speech are involved, courts should decide whether a certain law is constitutional by examining the legislative motivation behind the enactment).
10. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent As
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (arguing that the notion of a supposedly single
legislative intent that is shared by all legislators is inconsistent and self-contradictory).
11. On legislation, see U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). On judicial decisions, see Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937). See generally People's Mojahedin Org.
of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (comparing cases on appeal
from a district court, where the reviewing court is supposed to review "judgments, not opinions,"
and administrative law cases, where the reviewing court does "not sustain a 'right-result, wrongreason' decision of an agency"; in the latter, but not the former case, the reviewing court must
"send the case back to the agency so that it may fix its reasoning or change its result."). This is
not the case for administrative decisions: in administrative decision making, the Supreme Court's
position is that when an agency gives the wrong reason for a decision of policy or law, the reviewing court must send the case back for reconsideration, even though the court might have
upheld the order if a different reason had been assigned. See Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DuKE L.J. 199, 206.
12. For an example of a case in which the Supreme Court declared that the discrepancy between the real and the avowed reasons for arrest is not legally relevant, see Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). In that case, the police, concerned that the defendant was
impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. Id. at 148-49. They searched his car and found
a tape recorder that was recording the traffic stop. Id. at 149. They later argued that the defendant had made an illegal recording of a private conversation-a violation, they said, of Washington state's Privacy Act. Id. The Court found that the facts clearly established that no reasonable
officer could believe that the defendant violated the Privacy Act. Id. at 154. But in a unanimous
opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the police had probable cause to
arrest the defendant for impersonating a police officer, despite the fact that the officer's reasons
for doing so were not closely related to the Privacy Act offense that the police identified during
the arrest. Id. at 155. "An arresting officer's state of mind, except for facts he knows, is irrelevant to probable cause." Id.
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son for striking prospective jurors from a jury panel bear on the
legality of such a strike? 13 Consider the following exchange, which
occurred a few years ago in an American Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, between a military judge, a defense counsel, and a trial
counsel. 4 After the trial counsel had exercised his peremptory challenge against Captain Cherielynne Moore, the only female member of
5
the panel, the following discussion ensued:'
TC: My reason is her profession, not her gender.
MJ: What is her profession?
TC: She's a nurse with the medical group, sir.
MJ: I find that that's a non-gender specific reason. So, the peremptory is granted. Peremptory by the defense?
DC: Yes, Your Honor. And maybe for purposes of the record,
maybe it needs to be stated that I'm still concerned that that's a
pretext. But that's for the record purposes only.
MJ: I happen to know that-and I'm not agreeing with him-but
trial counsels-not these particular trial counsels-as a whole tend
13. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has answered this question in the affirmative,
while reviewing a trial court's decision to overrule a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
to strike two black men from a jury panel when the prosecutor claimed that the strikes were
motivated by the prospective jurors' hairdos and facial hair. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765
(1995). The Eighth Circuit declared,
[W]here the prosecution strikes a prospective juror who is a member of the defendant's
racial group, solely on the basis of factors which are facially irrelevant to the question
of whether that person is qualified to serve as a juror in the particular case, the prosecution must at least articulate some plausible race neutral reason for believing that those
factors will somehow affect the person's ability to perform his or her duties as a juror.
In the present case, the prosecutor's comments, "I don't like the way [he] look[s], with
the way the hair is cut .... And the mustache[ I and the beard[ I look suspicious to
me," do not constitute such legitimate race neutral reasons for striking juror 22.
Id. at 767 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994)). The Eighth Circuit concluded that the "prosecution's explanation for striking juror 22... was pretextual," and that the
state trial court had "clearly erred" in finding that striking juror number 22 had not been intentional discrimination. Id. at 767. The Supreme Court reversed, albeit noting that at some stage
of the analysis "implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be
pretexts for purposeful discrimination." Id. at 768. In State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 65 (Mo.
1987), the Supreme Court of Missouri, referring to the second stage of the three-step Batson
analysis, had stated,
We do not believe, however, that Batson is satisfied by "neutral explanations" which
are no more than facially legitimate, reasonably specific and clear. Were facially neutral explanations sufficient without more, Batson would be meaningless. It would take
little effort for prosecutors who are of such a mind to adopt rote "neutral explanations"
which bear facial legitimacy but conceal a discriminatory motive. We do not believe the
Supreme Court intended a charade when it announced Batson.
14. I use the example of a trial counsel's reasons for peremptory challenge because according
to the military justice personnel rules and procedures, trial counsels exercise the prosecutorial
function. Trial counsels in the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces are therefore functional
equivalents of prosecutors in ordinary courts. See 10 U.S.C. § 838 (2006).
15. See United States v. Chaney, 53 M.J. 383 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
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to exercise peremptories against med group folks. But it's specifically nurses, not male or female.

This dialogue suggests that the question of "why" a prosecutor
strikes a juror may have different meanings. Does the legal system
care about the actual motive that caused the prosecutor to strike or
does it only want to verify that the prosecutor can articulate, as a matter of legal justification, a non-discriminatory reason for the strike? In
other words, is law after sincerity understood as the giving of one's
motivating reasons or is it after sincerity understood as the capacity to
state at least one neutral, lawful reason? As Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in his famous Batson concurrence, "[A]ny prosecutor
can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial
courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons. ' 16 This assertion seems to suggest that the law should be interested in motives
rather than in justifications because of the easiness of fabricating posthoc rationalizations that appear neutral and lawful but are in fact
insincere.
This ambiguity brings to the fore the function of legal justification.
Public reason-giving has long been thought of as an essential duty of
democracies. 17 The giving of reasons, it is often said, ought to promote better public decision making by keeping the government's discretionary powers in check.' 8 However, this aim is compromised by
the possibility that decision makers may disclose insincere and misleading justifications as a means of preventing, rather than facilitating,

16. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
17. Plato's attack on the use of rhetoric in the public sphere can be interpreted as one of the
first expressions of this ideal. For instance, Socrates points out that "the rhetorician is a maker
of beliefs in his auditors' souls." See PLATO, GORGIAS 15 (E.M. Cope trans., 1864). The concern
is that rhetoric does not appeal to reason but instead leads us to experience emotions vicariously
and to become captive to them. By contrast, according to Socrates, any discourse aiming at truth
should be seeking not to produce emotions, but to give reasons. The Greeks called this demand
to make oneself intelligible logon didomai. See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 240 (Tom Griffith

trans., G.R.F. Ferrari ed., 2000). Legal discourse, just like any other discourse, should be regulated by the demand to logon didonai, that is, to give an account to yourself or others of what
you are saying.
18. The reason-giving requirement is a staple of the exercise of administrative functions in
modem bureaucratic states. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3) (2000)
("[Decisions] shall include a statement of... findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis
therefore, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record."). For a
theoretical discussion of the duty to give reasons as a check on public officials' discretion, see
David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, inCOMMON LAW
THEORY 134, 138-40 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007); Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 182.
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accountability. 1 9 Legal scholars have focused on the question of judicial candor and paid little attention to the fact that state actors' insincerity at every level of government might undermine the duty to give
reasons and, therefore, the government's accountability. This Article
argues, in contrast, that an examination of judicial sincerity in isolation, as is typically done, is too narrow. The issue of sincerity raises
concerns that go far beyond merely determining what judges should
or should not write in their opinions. We need to be able to hold all
state actors-not only judges-accountable for what they say. If
sincerity is indeed necessary to monitor public decisions, it should be
discussed in a context that is broader than that of judicial decision
making.
By looking at non-judicial as well as judicial sincerity, this Article
begins to fill the gap, for there currently exists in the literature no
general, systematic treatment of sincerity in legal decision making. It
will proceed by considering various arguments that articulate how
sincerity is necessary in the practice of legal reason-giving. By and
large, the scholarship to date has concentrated exclusively on specific
subcategories of the sincerity debate, usually by focusing on only one
branch of government. There is no literature that addresses the problem of sincerity across the three branches of government and that
takes into account the similarities and differences of sincere reasongiving in these diverse settings. While existing works provide excellent insights into the question of judicial sincerity, none attempts to
provide the broad and comprehensive analysis undertaken in this
Article.
Another problem with the currently dominant approach to sincerity
is that it does not consider the immense complexity of reason-giving
practices. By contrast, my approach takes into account the contextual
nature of public decision making. It acknowledges the fact that much
legal justification is attached to a specific and unique situation. In the
past twenty years, a significant body of literature has been built
around the usual assumption-which has dominated the discussion on
judicial candor-that there are only two normative positions available
to sincerity theorists: advocating full candor and justifying circumstantial lying. Quite the opposite, this Article suggests a more nuanced
framework that allows for at least three standards for assessing sincerity that are based on the extent to which actual motives should be
19. For example, David Shapiro, who focuses on judicial reason-giving, characterizes candor
as "the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power." Shapiro, supra note 6, at
737.
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nuanced by
disclosed. 20 This evaluation of sincerity is then further
21
context.
institutional
of
relevance
introducing the
In its common employment, the concept of sincerity refers primarily
22
to a correspondence between one's avowal and one's actual feelings.
By extension, in the legal setting, the conventional wisdom is to define
sincere reason-giving as the congruence between a decision maker's
avowed reasons for a given decision and his actual beliefs, views, or
preferences on the matter. However, I claim that there are at least
two different ways to understand this notion of congruence, depending on what the reason-giving requirement is interpreted to actually
require. In my view, such a requirement can take at least two forms.
If the requirement is that decision makers give justificatory reasons
that are also their motivating reasons, then sincerity describes the situation in which the reasons one presents are also one's motives. 23 In
this view, a decision maker is insincere whenever there is a discrepancy between his avowal of reasons and what actually motivated him.
The reason-giving requirement encompasses a motivation requirement in the sense that it demands that governmental agents' justificatory reasons for their actions coincide with their motivating reasons. I
propose to call this the "internalist" reading of the reason-giving requirement. By contrast, according to what I describe as a strong "externalist" reading, the requirement is merely one to give justificatory
reasons, regardless of decision makers' motives. Here, a decision
maker is sincere when she gives reasons that she thinks really justify
the outcomes. She does not need, in addition, to be moved by those
reasons. It is sufficient that she believes that the reasons she puts for20. See infra Part III.D.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. For a historical and literary account of the concept of sincerity, see LIONEL TRILLING,
SINCERITY AND AuTrHNTICrrY 27 (1972) (distinguishing between sincerity and authenticity and
arguing that sincerity requires one to act and be the way one presents oneself to others, while

authenticity involves finding "who we are" and recognizes the fact that certain actions express
the way in which "we really are").
23. I am referring to the distinction between normative and motivating reasons, which has
become ubiquitous in the literature on moral reasons over the past twenty years, at least since
Bernard Williams's famous article, Internal and External Reasons. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, In-

ternal and External Reasons, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 101 (1981).
The criterion for a motivating reason is roughly that it explains rather than justifies a person's
actions or decisions, whereas the criterion for a normative reason is that it justifies rather than
explains that person's actions or decisions. For more recent discussions, see, for example, Stephen Darwall, Internalism and Agency, 6 PHIL. PERSP. 155 (1992); Susan Hurley, Reason and
Motivation: The Wrong Distinction?,61 ANALYSIS 151 (2001); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Motivation, 77 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 99 (Supp. 1997); Simon Robertson, Reasons and Motiva-

tion-Not a Wrong Distinction, 106 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SoC'Y 391 (2006); John J. Tilley,
Justifying Reasons, Motivating Reasons, and Agent Relativism in Ethics, 118 PHIL. STUD. 373

(2004).
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ward are good reasons for the outcome. In this view, the calculation
of the degree of congruence between one's motives and the official
reasons one presents is not pertinent to the determination of sincerity.
In this externalist approach, law is after justificatory reasons, not after
motivating reasons: what is relevant is only whether officials have provided what they believe to be good reasons to justify their decisions.
These two interpretations suggest that whether decision makers are
"sincere" about their reasons often depends on whether they are held
to an externalist or to an internalist requirement. The same statement
of reasons may appear sincere if one has in mind an externalist requirement, but insincere if one is anticipating an internalist requirement. By and large, one should not expect the same kind of reasons
to equally satisfy both requirements. To make sense of sincerity in the
law, one must therefore analyze in more detail what it is exactly that
legal systems do when they announce a duty to give reasons. This
Article thus addresses two types of questions. The first is descriptive:
I ask whether the requirement to give reasons is usually intended by
the legal system as an externalist or an internalist requirement. The
second is normative: I discuss the merits and demerits of these two
readings of the requirement.
It should be noted that the question at issue is not that of determining whether legal propositions have truth-value, that is, whether they
can be qualified as true or false, but whether there is truthfulness in
legal decision making and justificatory discourse. 24 I discuss sincerity
in the legal process and not the truth of law. The focal point of this
Article is whether public officials' claims about what reasons inform
their decision making in the legal process should always be sincere
and what it means to say that they are misrepresenting the law or
giving deceitful justifications. My focus is on the extent to which the
reasons that public officials put forward can be qualified as sincere or
insincere. The goal is neither to articulate a theory of legal justification as sincere justification, nor to defend the controversial view that
legal justification should be indifferent to truthfulness or deception. I
argue only that the way in which the debate has been framed distorts
the question by ignoring important variations in the way in which
sincerity can be interpreted and therefore implemented as a legal
requirement.
This Article is structured in four parts. In Part II, I begin by spelling out the importance of sincerity in legal discourse. Part III exam24. I will not address the question of whether law can be described in terms of truth and
falsehood. This is a wholly different question, which has been analyzed, for instance, by DENNIS
PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996), and ANNA PINTORE, LAW WiTHouT TRUTH (2000).
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ines in greater detail arguments for and against imposing on
institutional players a requirement to give sincere reasons for their
decisions. In Part IV, I clarify the idea of sincere reason-giving by
rendering more explicit what the legal community ordinarily expects
from the requirement to give reasons. Part V considers the differing
applicability of the analysis to different public institutions by pointing
out the importance of context in assessing sincerity. Finally, Part VI
draws on all preceding Parts to sketch out the contextual nature of the
duty to give sincere reasons, which has been largely overlooked in existing discussions. Contrary to what is generally assumed, reason-giving is a practice that is highly dependent upon context. In this sense,
normative and empirical questions pertaining to the sincerity requirement are often intertwined. The determination of whether reasons
should be sincere and how sincere they should be is dependent upon
the circumstances of their formulation. I therefore conclude by laying
out the elements of a theory of contextual sincerity.

II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SINCERITY IN THE LAW

A.

Sincerity in Law and Politics

Most people would agree that courts and other law-creating or lawapplying institutions are not meant to deliberately mislead the public.
Legal institutions are increasingly criticized for their lack of sincerity. 25 Judges, but also legislators, administrators, and other public officials, are routinely accused of feeding lies to the public, or at least of
26
embellishing the truth, when justifying their actions.
The evaluation of deception, however, varies across different domains of social life. There is an important difference between law and
politics in this regard. Hanna Arendt has pointed out that secrecies,
lies, and deception have been entangled with politics since its very
27
inception-at least since Plato's argument on the noble lie.
25. In a provocative article that is famous in legal academia, Martin Shapiro declared,
"Courts and judges always lie. Lying is the nature of the judicial activity.... Worrying about
whether judges ought or ought not to lie is foolhardy. Judges necessarily lie because it is the
nature of the activity they engage in." See Martin Shapiro, Judges As Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 155, 156 (1994).
26. To be sure, the broadly defined topic of transparency, lying, and secrecy in political life has
become somewhat fashionable in the disciplines of legal and political theory. See, e.g., SISSELA
BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978); LIONEL CLIFFE & MAUREEN
RAMSAY, THE POLITICS OF LYING (2000); HARRY FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005); HARRY
FRANKFURT, ON TRUTH (2006); THE RIGHT TO KNow (Ann Florini ed., 2007); GOVERNMENT
SECRECY IN DEMOCRACIES (Itzhak Galnoor ed., 1977); Elizabeth Markovits, The Trouble with

Being Earnest: Deliberative Democracy and the Sincerity Norm, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 249 (2006).
27. See HANNA ARENDT, Truth and Politics, in BETWEEN PAST AND FuTURE 227 (1993);
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 17, at 107.
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Machiavelli is famous for having urged upon the prince the way of the
fox. 28 Politicians have always been tempted to massage the truth in
order to win an election, to justify their own actions, or to discredit
opponents. Arendt concludes that truthfulness has hardly ever been
counted as a political virtue, so it should come as no surprise that the
issues of transparency and deception resurface regularly in political
discourse.
By contrast, in the legal context, there is a strong presumption that
decision makers should be sincere. 29 Sincerity towards and between
public institutions, honesty in statements to others, and accurate de30
pictions of the law are some of the defining features of legal ethics.
Sincerity is arguably a defining feature of democratic legal systems:
the ideal of the rule of law has traditionally been understood as comprising, among its most important requirements, the principle of publicity, which requires some form of sincerity. 31 The publicity principle
mandates not only disclosure but also sincere disclosure. Making the
law public exposes it to public deliberation and censure: publicity is
inseparable from some degree of sincerity in the sense that no serious
discussion of the law could occur if most citizens were not aware of its
content or only had access to a misleading depiction of it. More specifically, legal institutions such as courts, parliaments, and various
public administrations are distinct from other social institutions because of their frequent use of formal procedures aimed at furthering
the requirement of sincerity, such as taking oaths, calling witnesses,
convening expert panels, producing evidence, securing cross-examinations, and so on.
Assuming that sincerity is of special importance to the legal process,
are we to conclude that public officials should always be truthful
about their reasons when justifying their decisions? As is often the
28. See NIccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 68 (W.K. Marriott trans., Forgotten Books
2008) (1532) (arguing that a prince, "being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to
choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox
cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the
snares and a lion to terrify the wolves.").

29. But see John M. Kang, The Case for Insincerity, in 29 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 143-64 (Austin Sarat & Patricia Ewick eds., 2003) (discussing
sincerity as applied to the question of whether religious arguments may be used in liberal democracies, and arguing that sincerity is irrelevant and perhaps even harmful in fostering agreement
and mutual respect between religionists and secularists).
30. Lawyers-be they attorneys, judges, arbitrators, or administrators-must usually take
oaths and comply with local rules of ethics that are laid down in professional responsibility
codes, such as the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct for
attorneys.
31. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
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case in contemporary jurisprudence, the current academic discussion
on sincerity in the law is judge-centric. Legal scholars have mostly
focused on what has come to be known as "judicial candor. ' 32 They
concentrate on the fact that judges might hold certain assumptions,
motivations, and theories that underlie their decisions (their "true"
reasons for deciding in favor of a particular outcome), on the one
hand, but give, on the other hand, very different "official" reasons to
publicly justify their decisions. Typically, while the reasons given in
public and put on record appear to be purely "legal"-in the sense
that they are borrowed from acknowledged legal sources such as constitutions, statutes, precedents, or even the intent of framers or legislators-commentators often suspect that the "real reasons" underlying
a decision rest on political, economic, moral, philosophical, or relig33
ious preferences.
Much legal scholarship on judicial sincerity has been built around
an opposition between those who favor judicial candor and those who
criticize it. Two camps have emerged. Although most legal scholars
insist that it is an inherent requirement of the judicial function to give
candid reasons, 34 more recently, some writers have urged that judges
may sometimes be justified in misrepresenting their reasons. 35 The
32. For a recent presentation and discussion of the legal scholarship on judicial candor, see
Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008) (distinguishing between the
concepts of candor and sincerity, with candor being an ambiguous concept encompassing both a
requirement of sincerity and of full transparency-meaning that judges are candid when they
disclose all the information that they believe to be relevant to a legal decision-while sincerity
imposes a lesser requirement because it merely demands intentional consistency between belief
and utterance).
33. This is a typical legal realist and Critical Legal Studies type of challenge, which develops
by denouncing the fictitious character of axiologically neutral reasons in the law in an effort to
"unmask" the underlying motivations for public decisions. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND (1930) (equating the law with decisions in actual cases and predictions of
decisions, rather than rules, and pointing out that although judges may talk about basing their
decisions "on the law"-statutes, precedents, etc.-such talk is only "window dressing" for decisions that are actually'based on the judge's biases and policy preferences); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (arguing that
U.S. Supreme Court justices decide cases based on their political viewpoint rather than on the
law); Allan C. Hutchison & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholar: The
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1984) (emphasizing
the Critical Legal Studies thesis that "[1Iegal doctrine can be manipulated to justify an almost
infinite spectrum of possible outcomes").
34. For arguments in favor of judicial candor, see, for example, Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and
Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983); Schwartzman, supra note 32; David L. Shapiro, supra note
6.
35. For criticism of judicial candor, see, for example, RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM

AND DEMOCRACY 350-52 (2003); Paul Butler, When Judges Lie (and When They Should), 91
MINN. L. REV. 1785 (2007) (arguing that judicial lying is justified when necessary to avoid ex-

treme injustice); Scott C. Idleman, A PrudentialTheory of JudicialCandor,73 TEX. L. REV. 1307
(1995) (arguing that judges, subject to prudential considerations, may enjoy substantial discre-
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dispute over the vices and virtues of candor, however, can be traced
back to older discussions about legal reasoning, such as the debate
between legal realists and advocates of reasoned elaboration. 36 The

main premise of realist approaches to reason-giving is that judges and
other decision makers rarely disclose their genuine reasons. Instead,
they are always involved in some kind of ex post rationalizing-where
rationalizing is taken in a pejorative sense. 37 By contrast, partisans of
tion as to candor); Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 721 (1979)
(analyzing famous conceptions of adjudication and judicial opinions, and pointing out that less
than candid reasons do not automatically make for bad judicial opinions); Shapiro, supra note
25, at 156 (claiming that "[clourts and judges always lie. Lying is the nature of the judicial
activity."); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353
(1989) (arguing that judicial candor in statutory interpretation poses legitimacy concerns and
calls into question judges' checking function).
36. For the most important discussions of "reasoned elaboration" views, see HERBERT M.
HART & A.M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICA-

TION OF LAW (1958) (developing the idea of judicial opinions as "reasoned elaborations" and
stressing that the thinking of judges about particular cases could mature into "reason," an interpersonal notion); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978) (arguing that the "essence" of adjudication lies in the mode of participation it accords the
affected party, that is, the presentation of proof and reasoned arguments); Kent Greenawalt, The
Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles,78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978) (defending Wechsler
against his critics and arguing that if judges hold themselves to neutral principles, they are more
likely to render appropriate decisions,and that their decisions and the decisions supporting them
will better promote the development of the law); Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles
of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1959) (implying that judges should be required to support their choices through a "type of reasoned explanation," which involves reaching judgment based on neutral principles and reasons that transcend the immediate result); G.
Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticism and Social
Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973) (arguing that the reasoned elaboration movement is due to a
reaction against legal realism and can be historically traced back to the Second World War, when
jurists started to seek a jurisprudence that would guarantee against totalitarianism). For realist
arguments demythologizing so-called reasons, see Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929) (arguing
that the rules are merely means by which judges justify a result they had previously reached on
the basis of intuitive "hunches"); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication:A
CriticalPhenomenology, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 518 (1986) (arguing that judges are essentially pursuing political agendas when adjudicating cases and that the reasons provided in support for their
decisions mainly serve to disguise their manipulations of the "law" in order to justify the outcomes that they like); Moses Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench, 49
CAL. L. REV. 831, 832 (1961) (arguing that opinions fail to fulfill their three functions: (1) they
fail to state the law because judges make the laws they like; (2) they fail to mollify litigants
because courts often decide issues that were not argued at all by the litigants, or the courts do
not decide issues that were presented by litigants; and (3) they fail to "make the judges think");
Max Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CAL. L. REV. 486 (1930) (criticizing the
requirement of written opinions from a time management point of view because it is inconvenient for judges, who lose time preparing opinions; for lawyers, who lose time reading them; and
for litigants, who see an increasing delay in the final disposition of cases).
37. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 653 (1932) (arguing
that "[o]pinions ... disclose but little of how judges come to their conclusions. The opinions are
often ex post facto; they are censored expositions.") (emphasis omitted).
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reasoned elaboration maintain that the key ends served by reasongiving cannot be achieved in the absence of candor. In their view, a
decision that is justified by false reasons is necessarily an unreliable
guide to the future because the real-albeit concealed-reasons, and
not the false ones, will actually determine the resolution of later cases.
B.

Legal Contexts in Which the Problem of Sincerity Arises

Before further analyzing the various situations in which the problem of sincerity arises, we must ask whether the law recognizes a requirement to give sincere reasons in the first place. My claim is that
the requirement of sincerity, where it exists, is usually implicit in the
duty to give reasons. To be sure, legal systems rarely present us with a
formula to the extent that decision makers must disclose "sincere reasons" for their action because sincerity is generally assumed. Sincerity
works as a default rule for legal justification. In this regard, legal discourse does not differ from ordinary rules of communication: just as
daily conversations are regulated by an implicit norm of sincerity, le38
gal justifications provided by state actors are expected to be sincere.
In everyday interactions, sincerity works as a guarantor of communicative validity in that the sheer possibility of communication with
others relies on such transparency. Where participants in an exchange
are deemed uncooperative and distrustful, a group is unable to continue a conversation. This implicit norm of sincerity is so deeply
rooted in our cultural practices and expectations that it is rarely mentioned explicitly. In light of this, it should come as no surprise that the
same norm of sincerity seems to underlie legal discourse in general
and reason-giving in particular.
In fact, the problem of sincerity arises in a variety of legal contexts.
Sincerity in legal reason-giving may raise specific concerns for the
three branches of government. As suggested above, citizens anticipate that members of the Executive 39-be they top-level executives
such as secretaries of state or street-level bureaucrats such as police
38. According to Searle's speech-act theory of sincerity, a speech-act is sincere only when the
speaker has the state of mind expressed by the speech-act. As Searle puts it, "[T]he sincerity
condition tells us what the speaker expresses in the performance of the act." JOHN SEARLE,
SPEECH ACrs: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 65 (1969). But as Micah Schwartzman points out, it must be possible for a speaker to be sincere even if her speech-act did not
reflect her "state of mind," provided she believed that it expressed her state of mind, even if it
really did not. See Schwartzman, supra note 32, at 993.
39. The key case here is Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), in which the Supreme Court developed its motive doctrine. In Arlington Heights, the Court considered whether racial considerations motivated a local zoning
board's refusal to rezone land for higher-density housing. Id. at 254.
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give sincere reasons when called to account for their

actions. Members of the Judiciary, whether deciding as single judges
or as part of multimember panels, should be honest with the public
about how they arrive at their decisions. 4 1 Although legislators are in
principle under no duty to explain and justify their decision to legislate, in certain areas of law, they can be called upon to give a reason
for a given statute, and reviewing courts will occasionally verify the
42
sincerity of that reason.

Sincerity usually matters to the law whenever a rule prohibits public
officials from acting based on certain considerations, such as discriminatory or otherwise illicit purposes. 43 If the requirement of sincerity is
to have meaning, it must be based -on more than a vague and unen40. In spite of the Supreme Court's assurances to the contrary in Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that "[slubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable
cause Fourth Amendment analysis"), Fourth Amendment jurisprudence arguably imposes a duty
on police officers to give sincere reasons, inasmuch as it calls for an analysis of the reasons why a
search or a seizure was undertaken. See Eric F. Citron, Note, Right and Responsibility in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence:The Problem with Pretext, 116 YALE L.J. 1072 (2007). The constitutionality of arrest under the Equal Protection Clause depends on the motives of officials. See
United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1151 (2006)
(finding insufficient evidence of a racial motive by police officers); Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d
995, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2003).
41. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
42. The acknowledgment that legislators' reasons may matter to the constitutionality of legislation dates back at least to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The Court stated,
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited
by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come
before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.
Id. at 423. For more recent applications, see, for example, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). See also
Clark, supra note 9 (arguing that legislative motivation should be central in upholding statutes
not only in equal protection analysis but also more generally in the analysis of "fundamental
rights").
43. Such rules exist in the three branches of government. For instance, the First Amendment
bars the government from firing employees because they have exercised their protected speech
rights. See Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977) (concerning
the non-renewal of a untenured teacher's contract by a school board because of the teacher's call
to a radio station that criticized the school's proposed dress code, and addressing the question of
whether the school board's retaliatory motive was the "cause" of the teacher's injury). The First
Amendment also prohibits legislators from passing a statute that is motivated by the goal of
restricting an unpopular religion. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254-55 (1982) (challenging a Minnesota statute as discriminatory because it provided that only those religious organizations that receive more than half of their total contributions from members or affiliated
organizations are exempt from the registration and reporting requirements of the statute). As
for the judiciary, this prohibition is generally channeled through ethics rules such as the canons
of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007). Canon 2, entitled "A Judge Shall Perform the
Duties of Judicial Office Impartially, Competently, and Diligently," speaks particularly to a
judge's duty to refrain from deciding cases based on her illicit motives. On judges' ethical re-
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forceable obligation to be sincere. Without some form of monitoring
by a supervising agency or through judicial review, the sincerity requirement could be ignored with impunity. So far, the key legal tool
to monitor public decision making and to enforce these types of
prohibitions has been to establish an ex ante or ex post duty to give
reasons,44 that is, to require that decision makers justify their decisions upon making them or, alternatively, to be prepared to provide
reasons at a later time if asked to do so. 4 5 Reasons assist the reviewing agencies or the courts in performing their supervisory function,
which is often based on criteria such as whether public officials took
account of relevant considerations or acted for improper purposes,
and these criteria are much easier to apply if the decision makers'
reasons are stated explicitly. It would be extremely difficult to establish whether a public body really did act for improper purposes or on
irrelevant considerations unless one can have access to the reasons
that prompted the decision. The duty to give reasons thus enables
supervising officers to check whether decisions have been based on
lawful reasons. However, this aim is compromised if the reasons provided by a public official do not track the actual reasons for the decision. The concern is that decision makers may solely disclose
insincere and misleading justifications as a means of preventing accountability. This is why it is plausible to claim that there is an implicit sincerity requirement built into the duty to give reasons: if there
were no such requirement, reason-giving would become a self-defeating activity.
What is the effect of non-compliance with a requirement to give
sincere reasons? The difficulty is that the failure to give sincere reasons does not usually make a decision automatically invalid and unenforceable.46 Reviewing agencies or courts can of course undertake to
investigate the validity of the reasons, but as long as the reasons are
sponsibilities when it comes to writing opinions, see generally Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical
Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL Emnics 237 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process:Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60, 86 (1976) (arguing that "[t]he
formality of having to provide a detailed written statement of reasons is itself likely to deter
some, although admittedly not all, bad faith dealings").
45. For a discussion of the distinction between an automatic obligation to give reasons and an
obligation that arises only upon request, see H.L. Kushner, The Right to Reasons in Administrative Law, 24 ALTA. L. REV. 305, 324-25 (1986).

46. The main question here is whether the failure to state sincere reasons should be analyzed
from the perspective of either a substantive or procedural requirement that has not been complied with. In the former case, the underlying decision would be invalid, but in the latter case,
the effect of a breach upon the status of a decision is somewhat unclear because non-compliance
with a procedural or formal requirement does not automatically render a decision invalid. See
Shapiro, supra note 18, at 197-98.
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lawful, little can be done. A decision justified by insincere reasons can
only be challenged if it can be proved that the motivating factor was
an unlawful one. But the problem is that such proof is extremely difficult to establish. 47 Those affected by the decision, be they private in-

dividuals or the public at large, may undertake to prove that the
reason given on the face of the decision was not the real reason that
moved decision makers if they can satisfy the very heavy onus of
proof applicable to what is in effect an allegation of fraud. 48 Extrinsic
evidence of the reasons for a decision may be hard to find and may be
unreliable. 49 Of course, reviewing agencies or courts are not com-

pletely powerless to review the reasons for the decision because they
may be able to infer what the real reasons are from the circumstances
50
or the impact of the decision.
47. John Hart Ely has termed this the "ascertainability problem." John Hart Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212 (1970).
48. Some scholars, however, have argued that legislative intent can be proved using a "but
for" standard. The idea is that we can attribute a certain intent to a legislature if, but for a
certain minimum number of legislators sharing this intent, a statute would not have been passed.
See, e.g., Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers:A Subpoena
for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REv. 879 (1985).
49. On the difficulty of finding circumstantial evidence for proving legislative motive, see
Brest, supra note 8, at 120-23.
50. This inferential approach is particularly obvious in the Batson analysis, which aims at
resolving allegations regarding the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury selection
with a three-step framework. In Batson, the Court explained that a party can make out a prima
facie case (step one) "by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference
of discriminatory purpose." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986). Relevant evidence
for this purpose might include (1) statistical or circumstantial evidence that jurors are being
systematically excluded from jury service on account of race or sex; (2) the pattern of strikes
used by the challenged party; or (3) the fact that the strike was exercised against a member of a
protected class. Id. at 96-97. Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor to offer a neutral explanation for striking the juror (step two). Id. at 97.
If the prosecutor offers a permissible, race-and-sex-neutral justification for the strike, the trial
court proceeds to decide, on the basis of the totality of the facts and evidence, whether the
neutral reason provided by the challenged party was sincere (step three). Id. at 98. Even though
the Batson Court did not explicitly use the language of "sincerity," but rather that of "pretextuality," the issue at step three is whether the neutral reason offered by the prosecutor is sincere.
The burden-shifting framework works as a sincerity device in that it aims at uncovering whether
there is a neutral reason for the strike and whether that reason is pretextual (or insincere). For
instance, the Court in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995), stressed that although facially
neutral explanations satisfy the step two burden, "implausible or fantastic explanations may (and
probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination." See also Owens v. State,
531 So.2d 22, 24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), an Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals case in which a
prosecutor's purportedly neutral reasons for using fifteen of his twenty-three strikes against African-Americans were rejected based on his admission that the fact that the juror "was the same
race as the defendant was a factor in his decision to strike." But see Howard v. Sendowki, 986
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1993), for a different outcome despite similar facts. The Howard court nonetheless recognized that the central question in a pretext case is whether the facially neutral reason
offered by the challenged party was the real reason for the strike. Id. at 27.
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To make things even more difficult, public decisions, whether made
by a group or an individual, are often made for multiple reasons.
Where two reasons are stated and one is bad and the other good, then
the decision will usually be valid, provided that the reasons are independent, not cumulative, and can be severed from each other.5 1 In
other words, where a decision is based on alternative reasons, it will
not be invalid if only one of the reasons is improper.5 2 This has led
the Supreme Court to develop, in some areas of law, the so-called
mixed-motive analysis. 53 In certain situations, public officials who
have provided illicit reasons may be allowed to subsequently amend
the statement of reasons contained in their previous decisions. Subtracting from the original statement of reasons or substituting new
reasons is a common legislative practice, and as I will argue below, it
should perhaps be generalized to other state actors. 54 In the next Section, I will frame my contribution within the ongoing debate concerning judicial candor and spell out the novelty of my approach to
thinking about legal sincerity.
C.

The Sincerity Problem: Not Circumscribed to Courts

My project is broader than what has been discussed earlier in the
sense that I am not only interested in judges but also, more generally,
in all the decision makers who are entrusted with the task of making
public decisions based on the law and who are required to publicly
51. This is the mixed-motive test developed in Mount Healthy City Board of Education v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the plaintiffs sought a zoning variance
from the defendant in order to construct public housing projects for minorities. 429 U.S. at 254.
The plaintiffs' application was denied, and they brought an equal protection challenge that was
supported by evidence that several zoning board members had been motivated by racial bias. Id.
The Court explained that the evidence, taken alone, could not be the basis for overturning the
board's decision:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory
purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision.
Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that
the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been
considered.
Id. at 271 n.21.
52. For a discussion of this problem in the case of legislatures, see Richard L. Hansen, Bad
Legislative Intent, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 843.
53. Mixed-motive analysis originated in two landmark cases, Mount Healthy City Board of
Education, 429 U.S. at 274, and Village of Arlington Heights., 429 U.S. at 252. See generally
Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in
Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279 (2006) (arguing that mixed-motive cases can be analogized to
multiple causation cases in that two concurrent forces-a lawful motive and an illicit motiveboth cause an actor to embrace a given course of action).
54. See infra Part IV.D.
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justify those decisions-be it in virtue of a formal legal duty to give
reasons, or in virtue of a dominant social practice that pressures them
to give reasons. In most legal systems, not only courts but also administrative agencies are required to give reasons to substantiate their decisions.55 Legislators and members of the Executive increasingly tend
to put forward reasons in support of their actions. 56 Even public or

semi-public institutions such as hospitals, law-enforcement agencies,
schools and universities, and banks and other financial institutions are
57
compelled to justify their actions to a greater extent than in the past.

Because decision makers across all major public institutions are potentially subjected to the duty to give reasons, it makes little sense, in
my view, to limit the discussion to judicial decision making. To be
sure, there are clearly substantial differences between judges and
other governmental agents: judges are generally expected to write detailed opinions while political officials, for example, are allowed to

speak in more casual ways and without the controls of precedent or
55. For example, in the United States, the Administrative Procedures Act requires reasons for
certain administrative decisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988). In France, the July 11, 1979 statute established a duty for all administrative agencies to justify unfavorable individual decisions.
See Law No. 79-587 of July 11, 1979, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Franqaise [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], July 12, 1979, p. 1711-12. In England, the Tribunal and Inquiries Act 1958
created an obligation for tribunals to give reasons. See Tribunals and Inquiries Act of 1958, 6 &
7 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 12 (Eng.); Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1992, 39 & 40 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 10 (Eng.).
For a comparative analysis of the reason-giving requirement in American and European law, see
Shapiro, supra note 18, at 179-221.
56. Of course, legislators are generally not required by law to give any reason for their decisions, that is, for the statutes they enact. For instance, a background rule of American constitutional law is that Congress is not required to furnish reasons for enacting a statute. See, e.g., U.S.
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). This means that a court could uphold the constitutionality of a federal statute despite the fact that Congress has not provided any formal statement of reasons for it. Representatives can but need not justify legislation-for instance, by a
declaration of principle at the beginning of the legislative text-and they traditionally seldom do
so. However, we are now witnessing the emergence of a new trend towards more accountability
for legislators, which in practice translates into an increased tendency for representatives to volunteer reasons for their decisions. In most legal systems, this is merely a matter of informal
social norm, but the European Parliament and the European executive, that is, the Council and
the Commission, are now duty-bound to give reasons for their decisions. Article 253 of the EC
Treaty thus states,
Regulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by the European Parliament and
the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the Commission, shall state the
reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions which
were required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 253, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321).
57. Michael Power has analyzed this phenomenon, arguing that contemporary democracies
are faced with an "audit explosion," affecting an ever-increasing range of institutions. See
MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997). Similarly, Onora
O'Neill points out that this type of demand leads to "defensive" decision making rather than
improving the quality of public decisions. ONORA O'NEILL, A QUESTION OF TRUST 49-52

(2002).
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even statutory implication. 58 The kinds of speech are entirely different, so the rules for telling the truth are probably different as well.
Public officials are asked to give their reasons in very different ways,
and we expect more of a judge than a politician in this regard. Politicians lie. We worry more when judges lie.
That being said, I believe that the question of sincerity should be
raised with the same urgency applied to public institutions in general
as to courts, particularly at a time when there is talk of transparency
and publicity at every level of government.5 9 In practice, the reasongiving requirement is often enacted in legal systems as part of a more
general plan to '60promote transparency and to protect the public's
"right to know."
We therefore need to ask ourselves whether we
intend to impose a requirement to give truthful, genuine reasons when
we proclaim a duty to provide reasons.
My purpose here is to critically assess the common way of understanding the requirement to give reasons in the legal process. Much
liberal theorizing in the last few decades has been taken up with a
belief in the democratic virtues of reason-giving. 61 It is generally expected that decision makers will give candid, truthful reasons, thereby
enabling citizens to act on those reasons and criticize them if they disagree. This expectation is supported by the fact that in most democratic legal systems, the requirement to give reasons has been
constructed on the principle that public institutions should not enjoy
arbitrary power. 62 The practice of public institutions-and sometimes
their duty-to give reasons is in place so that citizens may view public
58. I discuss in more detail the differences that separate legal decision makers infra Part IV.A.
59. For a comparative description of this ever-growing phenomenon, see, for example, HERKE
KRANENBORG

&

WIM VOERMANS,

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:

A

Symposium, Transparence et Secret, 97 POUVOIR (2001). On the American debate about transparency, see
ARCHON FUNO, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007); Mark
Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006).
60. For instance, the French parliamentary debate concerning the July 11, 1979 statute that
(partially) extended the duty to give reasons to administrative agencies turned on the idea that
reasons would not only promote an ideal of transparency but would also introduce democratic
practices that are often lacking in the traditionally secretive and sometimes seemingly arbitrary
French administration. For a synthesized discussion of the French debate, see BRUNO LASSERRE
ET AL., LA TRANSPARENCE ADMINISTRATIVE (1987).
61. This view is particularly popular among deliberative democratic theorists. See, e.g., AMY
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).
62. For example, the French reason-giving requirement, which can be traced back to the August 16 and 24, 1790 revolutionary statute on judicial organization, was based on the principle-a
corollary of legislative sovereignty-that the arbitrary power of the courts under the Ancien
Rggime (the "Parlements") must end. The French citation is "loi des 16/24 aoOt 1790 relative q
l'organisation judiciaire, titre V, article 15," which in English would read: "August 16 and 24,
1790 Statute on Judicial Organization, Title V, Article 15."
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EC AND MEMBER STATE LEGISLATION (2005);
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action as reasonable and therefore, according to deliberative democratic theory, legitimate. In this tradition, reason-giving is conceived
of as a transparent window giving access to the decision maker's
thinking, such that the reasons offered are, or ought to be, the reasons
that account for the outcome of the decision. Unsurprisingly, this conception relies on an oversimplification. Before analyzing this difficulty in further detail, however, it is worth pausing for an instant to
consider a number of arguments that have been developed for and
against requiring sincere reason-giving.
III.

ARGUING FOR AND AGAINST SINCERITY IN THE LAW

This Part reviews the current state of the debate on legal sincerity.
More specifically, it provides a systematic overview of the different
normative positions that scholars have endorsed concerning the evaluation of sincerity in the law. As the discussion below demonstrates,
the idea that legal decision makers should adhere to a principle of
sincerity-and the nature of such a principle-is highly disputed. I
will begin by recounting arguments in favor of imposing a duty to give
sincere reasons on state actors, before turning to arguments critiquing
the appeal to sincerity.
A.

Arguments in Favor of Giving Sincere Reasons

What is the point of sincerity in public reason-giving after all?
Those who endorse the view that the requirement to give reasons is a
requirement to give sincere reasons generally do so from one of two
different perspectives. In the non-consequentialist view, giving insincere reasons is intrinsically wrong because it harms people's autonomy.63 Misrepresenting one's reasons is a way of disrespecting those
who are affected by the decision in the sense that harming autonomy
is a form of disrespect. In this understanding, the lack of sincerity
carries with it the implication that one's audience is less capable of
dealing with the truth and thus less worthy of respect than the decider.
In what follows, however, I develop a pragmatic discussion of
sincerity. I will not attempt to work out the value of sincerity per se.
The purpose of the argument is merely to inquire into instrumental
values for giving sincere reasons. Much scholarship on judicial candor
unfolds not by setting forth the values fostered by sincerity but rather
63. This is the canonical Kantian view. Kant argues that lying is intrinsically and always
wrong. When one lies, one not only harms others but also oneself and humanity in general. See,
e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives, in KANT's
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS (T.K. Abbott ed. & trans., London:
Longmans, Green 1898) (1797).
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64
by calling attention to the harms resulting from misrepresentations.
In this consequentialist perspective, allowing decision makers to misrepresent their reasons harms society by damaging relationships while
at the same time bringing discredit upon the legal system as a whole.
It is not that deceptive reasons are intrinsically bad; they are to be
avoided insofar as they produce bad results. To put it differently,
sincerity in public reason-giving can be defended on the ground that it
is necessary to achieve two fundamental democratic values: establish65
ing trust in public institutions and ensuring the guidance of citizens.
I now turn to the assessment of two consequentialist arguments in
favor of sincerity, according to which sincerity is indispensable to
achieve trust and guidance.

1.

Sincere Reasons Foster Trust

Insincere reasons harm relationships by undermining trust. This is
the case regardless of what the content of the speech-act is meant to
be, that is, regardless of whether a decision maker is claiming to present his motivating or his justificatory reasons for a given decision.
Most of us agree that there must be a minimal degree of trust in communication. This is why some level of truthfulness has always been
seen as essential to human society. As Plato has shown, even the
worst crooks do not lie to one another because their gangs could not
66
subsist without sincerity any more than other human associations.
Socrates uses the gang example to argue that justice is more powerful
than injustice as a matter of fact: if even immoral creatures must be
just towards one another so as to succeed at crime, a fortiori, regular
people should aspire to just relationships. The parable, translated into
the legal context, can be used to argue that sincerity is more powerful
than deceit because a society whose members are unable to distin64. A typical example of this way of presenting the issue can be found in Larry Alexander &
Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 LAW & PHIL. 393 (2003).
65. This idea has been long expressed in Bentham's utilitarian philosophy. See JEREMY BENTH-AM, POLriICAL TACtics 29-34 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that publicity en-

ables closer relations between citizens and the state by securing the trust of the governed in the
legislature and by creating a more informed electorate).
66. In Plato's Republic, Socrates asks Thrasymachus, who claims that justice can be defined as
the advantage of the mightier, the following questions:
[W]ould you have the good grace also to inform me whether you think that a state, or
an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of criminal conspirators
could act at all if they injured one another? No indeed, he said, they could not. But if
they refrained from injuring one another, then they might work together more effectively? Yes. And this is because injustice creates factions and hatred and in-fighting,
whereas justice imparts harmony and friendship; isn't that the way it works,
Thrasymachus.
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guish sincere messages from deceptive ones would ultimately collapse.
If citizens expect public officials to mislead them, they will become
wary of arguments offered in public discourse. This explains why requiring sincere reasons is often presented as necessary to building
trust in the legal system as a whole and in public institutions in particular. This idea rests on the supposition that once one starts telling a
lie, one is never believed again when telling the truth. In this view, the
problem of deception rests in its consequences. As Geoffrey Warnock
puts it,
It is not the implanting of false beliefs that is damaging, but rather
the generation of the suspicion that they may be being implanted.
For this undermines trust; and, to the extent that trust is undermined, all co-operative undertakings, in which what one person can
do or has reason to do is dependent on what others 67
have done, are
doing or are going to do, must tend to break down.
By analogy, if a lie is discovered in the justification of a decision, the
aim of achieving greater public acceptance of public decisions is compromised. There is no point in legal systems imposing a duty to give
reasons if we cannot suppose that these reasons will actually express
the decision makers' opinions. As soon as one relinquishes the requirement of sincerity, dealings with public institutions run the risk of
6a
turning into "strategic interactions," in Erving Goffman's sense. Coordination problems may appear if it is likely that decision makers will
give dishonest reasons. Game-like considerations develop, giving rise
to game-theory calculations about securing assurances. Decisions
about whether to disclose genuine reasons may have a structure similar to a prisoner's dilemma, where sincerity corresponds to cooperation and submission of deceptive reasons corresponds to defection. A
full discussion of the coordination implications of insincere reasongiving would take us too far afield. For the purposes of the present
argument, it suffices to note that making it common knowledge that
public officials are under a duty to give sincere explanations for their
decisions could possibly prevent strategic and game-like calculations
from arising.
2.

Only Sincere Reasons Provide Guidance

Another consequentialist argument in favor of sincere reasons emphasizes that deceitful reasons frustrate a central function of the law:
they jeopardize the law's capacity to guide people's conduct. Yet, if
the law is to be obeyed, it must be capable of guiding the behavior of
67. GEOFFREY J. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 84 (1971).
68. ERVING GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION (1969).
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its addressees. It must at least be the case that legal professionals and
ordinary citizens can find out what the law is and obey it.69 A number
of legal scholars have argued that judicial decisions should be forward-looking documents, conceived so as to guide lawyers who must
advise clients, and judges who must adjudicate disputes. 70 This argument can be extended to public decisions in general. We usually value
public justifications because we think they are reliable guides as to the
beliefs and intents of those in charge. We want to identify those beliefs and those intents because they help us in predicting future legal
outcomes and, therefore, in modifying our conduct accordingly. To
fulfill this guidance function, reasons must be accurate representations
of what decision makers actually believe. The public cannot form adequate judgments on the law and its content unless all the relevant information is made available.
Citizens constantly rely on public justifications to ascertain the precise content of the law. It is often insufficient to consult sourcessuch as constitutional texts, statutes, administrative or executive regulations, outcomes of past judicial and administrative decisions, and so
on-to know the law. In fact, law school students, especially in the
Anglo-American tradition, spend most of their academic careers studying the reasons that have been put forward by public officials to justify this or that statute, regulation, or judicial judgment. 7' When
representing clients or causes, attorneys, as well as non-governmental
organizations' representatives or other counselors, use past statements
of reasons to craft their arguments. Adjudicators look for guidance by
relying on reasons given by other courts in preparing their own rulings. When interpreting statutes, judges often support their own preferred interpretation by referring to the reasons legislators have
developed during the legislative debates. Lawyers and judges alike
need to know the scope of a decision and the purposes behind it in
order to determine whether and how it may bear on other, arguably
analogous situations. In deciding future courses of conduct, for-profit
and not-for-profit enterprises, as well as private individuals, may also
69. Joseph Raz thus stresses that "the law must be capable of being obeyed" and hence "it
must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects. It must be such that they can find out
what it is and act on it." JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 213-14 (1979) (emphasis
omitted).
70. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26
(1960) (stressing that the "opinion has one if not its major office to show how like cases are
properly to be decided in the future").
71. See generally

WILLIAM

P.

AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION

LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN

(1994).
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need to rely on previous justifications that were provided by certain
institutions in deciding future courses of conduct.
The question, then, is the following: if everyone working within the
system uses these reasons, does it mean that all assume that such reasons are sincere? From the perspective of guidance, insincere reasons
are unreliable guides for the future because the real-but concealedreasons, and not the false ones, will actually determine the resolution
of later cases decided by the same decision makers. Most of our
choices depend on our estimation of the situation. This guess relies in
part on information that we have acquired from others. Each time
public officials supply misleading reasons, they adversely affect our
conduct by making it more difficult for us to accurately picture the
state of the law. Deceptive reasons affect the distribution of power
because they confer a disproportionate power upon public officials.
By the same token, they frustrate the democratic rationale for extending reason-giving requirements. 72
According to liberal democratic theory, public institutions' practices-and sometimes duty-of reason-giving is required so that each
individual may view the state as reasonable and therefore legitimate. 73
Reasons provide grounds for criticism. Knowing the basis of a decision enables citizens to decide whether any further action should be
undertaken. The underlying idea is that a government does not exercise arbitrary power insofar as it is effectively contestable. 74 The main
problem with insincere reasons is that they alter citizens' choices at
different levels. A misleading reason may make one's goals seem unfeasible or may create new ones. As we have just seen, deceptive reasons may also conceal relevant alternatives. For example, this is the
case in the hypothetical scenario in which a landowner is falsely told
that her construction permit for a well has been denied on the ground
that the well would contaminate groundwater. Had the landowner
known that the real basis for the rejection was the aesthetic impact of
the well, she might have envisaged the possibility of constructing a
different type of well or of choosing a different location for construction. The deceitful reason deprived her of this opportunity.
The claim that sincere reasons are superior from a democratic point
of view enjoys a certain initial plausibility, but there is a significant
72. On the democratic function of reason-giving, see generally GERALD F. GAUS, AN ESSAY
(1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004).
73. See GAUS, supra note 72, at 130-58.
74. This argument is developed in Philip Pettit, Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive
ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY: JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM

Dilemma, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 268 (2001).
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range of cases in which just the opposite is true. Proponents of selective disclosure take this discrepancy to show that, in the law, sincerity
is a highly variable and contextual virtue. They emphasize that in
some circumstances, less than candid reasons are not only justified but
also advantageous, thereby accomplishing equally important democratic ends.
B.

Arguments Against Giving Sincere Reasons

75
There are a variety of arguments in the literature against sincerity.
Some detractors focus on showing that certain deceitful statements
are justified. If they concede that lying is usually wrong, they also
urge us to recognize that this presumption can sometimes be overcome, for example, when lying is morally justified. 76 Other writers
point out that too much insistence on sincerity can occasionally harm
democracy. 77 The former adopt the point of view of decision makers
and consider the fact that requiring absolute truthfulness can pervert
decision making. The latter focus on the public's well-being in arguing
that sometimes insincere reasons are preferable to sincere reasons.

1.

PragmaticReasons Against Giving Sincere Reasons

A requirement to give sincere reasons may have a detrimental effect on the quality of public decisions, thereby ultimately harming
consumers of public services. To see this more clearly, one should
keep in mind that public decision making, which is often idealized and
set aside from other activities, is also a professional activity similar to
many others. As such, it is subjected to a host of professional norms.
In practice, public institutions must accommodate multiple practical
constraints. As Michael Lipsky has shown, "street-level bureaucracies," that is, public institutions whose workers interact with clients
and have discretion over the allocation of public benefits or sanctions,
75. For an overview, see ALEX RUBNER, THE MENDACIOUS COLOURS OF DEMOCRACY: THE
ANATOMY OF BENEVOLENT LYING (2006).
76. See, e.g., DAVID NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH: TRUTH TELLING AND DECEIVING IN
ORDINARY LIFE (1993).
77. For instance, Elizabeth Markovits argues, from the standpoint of nonideal deliberative
democratic theory, that the candor requirement poses dangers to democratic communication.
Her argument is that, given that public officials are not sincere and, further, that they cater to
the demand for sincerity by trying to appear sincere (straight talking and so forth), it harms
democracy if citizens are too trusting. See Markovits, supra note 26, at 255-57. Interestingly, a
number of scholars have also questioned the consequentialist justifications of candor principles
and other transparency-related mechanisms by arguing that the empirical claims about transparency's positive consequences remain unproven. See, e.g., Neal D. Finkelstein, Introduction:
Transparency in Public Policy, in TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC POLICY 1, 1 (Neal D. Finkelstein
ed., 2000).
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must decide cases on a mass basis. 78 The proliferation of rules and
regulations bearing on decision makers, together with the growing
number of cases they are in charge of adjudicating, make it unlikely
that a generalized requirement to give sincere reasons would improve
the quality of the service. Public service workers typically face choices
79
and competing demands that compromise sincerity.
Major impediments to sincere reason-giving lie in time limitations
and in an endemic lack of resources, both of which prohibit individualized service. These constraints restrict the amount of information
that is released and, assuming that sincerity often requires more extensive disclosures of information than insincerity, may compromise
sincerity. 80 It is a well-known phenomenon that street-level bureaucracies are virtually never sufficiently accounted for in terms of
budget, staff, and facilities, partly because the demand for services
tends to exceed the supply. The result is that decision making persistently occurs under conditions of limited time and information. If in an
ideal world, public officials ought to respond to cases individually, in
reality, they develop short-cuts to resolve broadly defined types of situations.81 People are processed into "clients" and assigned to categories for treatment. Stereotypical justifications are developed
accordingly. This leads to routinized and simplified reason-giving.
Accountability and monitoring mechanisms represent an additional
constraint because governmental agents' performances are increasingly measured and weighed against established standards such as per78. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIIN PUBLIC SERVICES 3 (1980) (defining street-level bureaucrats as "workers who interact
directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work").
79. In this context, insincerity can serve to insulate bureaucracies from control, thereby enabling them to pursue their interests without restraint from other governmental agencies and
organizations. This idea was already present in Weber's contention that bureaucracies operate
"to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret." MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 233
(Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946).
80. For example, in the United States, discourse requirements related to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests have proven very expensive, and increasingly so, for American taxpayers. "In Fiscal Year 2007, the total cost of all FOIA related activities for all federal departments
and agencies, as reported in their annual FOIA reports, was an estimated $369,431,500.55." Office of Information & Privacy, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Summary of Annual FOIA Reports for
Fiscal Year 2007, http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2008foiapost23.htm (last visited Mar. 7,
2010).
81. This is even more true in an age of ever-increasing use of information and communication
technology. See generally Mark Bovens & Stavros Zouridis, From Street-Level to System-Level
VIDUAL

Bureaucracies: How Information and Communication Technology Is Transforming Administrative Discretion and Constitutional Control, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 174 (2002).
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formance indicators.8 2 Police officers are typically expected to make a
certain number of arrests. Administrators are often obliged to retain
a threshold level of intakes and case-closing rates. Researchers are
required to publish a minimum number of articles in academic journals, which are in turn ranked periodically. Again, this form of expedited decision making does not prevent sincerity in and of itself, but it
does so indirectly by limiting the amount of information that can realistically be disclosed.
These various obstacles to transparent and accurate reason-giving
raise the question of whether decision makers are sometimes justified
in sacrificing sincerity to expediency. The problem with non-individualized, standardized reasons is that rather than helping consumers or
improving the administration's transparency, they may end up confusing the public and obscuring the system's functioning. 83 Default
clauses, jargon, and ready-made explanations act as barriers to understanding how to operate effectively within the system, especially for
underinformed and underprivileged clients who require individualized
attention and explanations. At times, fewer reasons and incomplete
reasons might be preferable to candid but convoluted reasons, provided the curtailed reasons are more pedagogical and widely
accessible.
2.

Strategic Reasons Against Sincere Reasons: The Case for Secrecy

In democratic regimes, should citizens be informed about all the
decisions governmental agents make and about all the reasons for
those decisions? American citizens do not seem to enjoy such an un84
qualified legal right to be informed by governmental organizations.
82. On this trend, see generally TED GAEBLER & DAVID OSBORNE, REINVENTING GOVERN-

How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992)
(claiming that nearly every aspect of government could be entrusted to the private sector and
arguing that when government is in charge of implementation, waste and inefficiency occur).
For a critical evaluation of this trend, see, for example, Christopher Hood, The "New Public
Management" in the 1980s: Variation on a Theme, 2 Accr. ORG. & Soc'y 93 (1995); Richard H.
Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995).
83. For a critical analysis of the concept of transparency as applied to government and corporations, see Fenster, supra note 59, at 893 (suggesting that we need to complicate our understanding of transparency, which is too often viewed as an unmitigated good, while also arguing
that government is frequently too secret).
84. The U.S. Constitution does not provide an individual right of access to government information. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978). Federal open-government statutes
require open meetings and disclosure of federal records (with exceptions). See, e.g., Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (requiring that each federal agency make information available to the public upon request, subject to a series of exceptions); Government in
the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006) (providing, with ten specified exemptions, that every
portion of every meeting of an agency shall be open to public observation).
MENT:
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Another way of arguing in favor of selective disclosure is to identify
certain public decisions that, because of their importance for citizens'
security or welfare, should be exempted from the requirement that
they be accompanied by sincere reasons. 85 Here, disingenuous reasons are justified with reference to the public interest. Secrecy is
sometimes necessary for reasons of efficacy. The underlying idea is
that we cannot expect a government to give sincere reasons on certain
strategic matters, especially matters that involve military interests and
foreign affairs and even matters related to economic interests such as
plans for devaluation, which cannot be disclosed without harm to the
national economy. Decision makers are justified in concealing or
even misrepresenting certain pieces of strategic information, the argument goes, because such information could not be made available to
other institutions or to the public at large without at the same time
being divulged to the "enemy."
Politics has by tradition been associated with secrecy. 86 The law has
often backed public institutions' use of secrecy. In the United States,
secrecy is upheld by a series of laws and constitutional practices, the
best known being the "executive privilege. ' 87 In virtue of the executive privilege doctrine, the President of the United States is allowed to
withhold certain information from Congress, the courts, and virtually

85. For an account of the federal government's resistance to disclosure whenever national
security is at stake, see Thomas S. Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the
United States: Beyond the Balancing Test, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT:
STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 33 (2003). For an example of governmental agents arguing that
openness would be a burden, see Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918,
922-23 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004) (arguing that the government has met
its burden of showing that the disclosure of information about the identity of certain detainees
would harm ongoing law enforcement efforts and national security).
86. At least since Machiavelli. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 28. For a discussion of the connection between politics and secrecy, see Carl J. Friedrich, Introduction to GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN DEMOCRACIES (Itzhak Galnoor ed., 1977).
87. Executive privilege is the American counterpart of the British doctrine of "crown privilege." The American executive privilege has no express textual source in the Constitution, but
jurists have long claimed that the separation of powers doctrine implies that the Executive
Branch has the right to withstand certain infringements by Congress and the judiciary, such as
undue demands for documents or information. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
(reviewing President Nixon's claims of executive privilege as a defense to the release of documents and tapes related to Watergate). On the existence and extent of the privilege, see generally MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (2002) (recognizing the executive privilege as qualified by compromise between Congress and the President, subject to courts' interpretations). But see RAOUL BERGER,
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974) (claiming that the judiciary should be
a prioriskeptical of executive secrecy by virtue of Congress's "senior" status over the Executive
Branch).
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any other public institution or private citizen.8 8 President George W.
Bush has claimed this privilege recently to justify withholding information when its release would, in his view, put the country's security
at risk or impair his ability to make informed and effective decisions.8 9
It should be noted that freedom from a duty to provide information is
not ipso facto freedom to be insincere, but as a matter of fact, the
former often yields the latter.
The President, however, is not the only public official afforded the
right to abstain from giving sincere reasons. Many administrative officials share in this privilege. 90 In recent years, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has used the doctrine to refuse
to provide lawmakers with a full explanation of why it rejected California's greenhouse gas regulations. 91 To be sure, courts have declared that other members of the Executive Branch cannot invoke the
executive privilege in the strict sense. 92 However, many federal statutes allow or sometimes even require executive agencies to withhold
information from the public. 93 Much of this legislation is designed to
protect rights of privacy on the part of either individuals or organizations. Here, the argument in favor of allowing secret reasons is negatively justified by the desire to prevent harm. In what follows,
selective disclosure is defended on the ground that it positively benefits the public.

88. On the inter-branch informational dispute, see, for example, William P. Marshall, The
Limits on Congress' Authority to Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781 (discussing
the inter-branch informational dispute).
89. President George W. Bush asserted executive privilege on several occasions during his
two mandates to deny requests for disclosure. For instance, on June 28, 2007, he invoked executive privilege when withholding subpoenaed documents concerning the White House and Justice
Department's deliberations over the firing of nine U.S. attorneys. On the controversy surrounding allegations concerning the Bush Administration's efforts to control the flow of information
from the Executive Branch, see generally JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE
SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2004).

90. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Consideringthe
Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95 (2004).
91. On January 18, 2008, the EPA refused to disclose to a congressional environmental committee the records that the committee had requested on the agency's refusal to allow California
to adopt new emission standards.
92. Neither Congress nor Executive Branch agencies are permitted to regulate private citizens' behavior through rules the citizens do not or cannot know about. See, e.g., Brinton v.
Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that the Freedom of Information Act
does not permit keeping secret "final statements of policy or final actions of agencies, which
have the force of law or which explain actions the agency has already taken" or "communications that promulgate or implement an established policy of an agency").
93. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).
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Sincere Reasons May Harm Citizens: Protecting the Public

There is also a long tradition of justifying lies and deception in the
political domain with reference to the good consequences they can
bring about. Well-meant misrepresentations are produced with the intention to protect or bring about some other good. Several arguments
have been developed to support this view. One such argument consists of pointing out that sincerity is harmful because it produces excessive complexity. This way of thinking can be traced back to
discussions of what Bernard Williams has ironically called "Government House utilitarianism.

'94

The expression refers to the thought,

originally developed by Henry Sidgwick, that utilitarianism is the correct moral theory, but that it might sometimes be better if the theory
were kept secret because most people are not able to use it properly
as a decision-making procedure. 95 From this, Sidgwick concluded that
the utilitarian calculus-the object of which is to maximize utility-is
96
more suitable for policy makers than for private individuals. Most
people should be given very general, simple rules to follow, while truly
utilitarian decision-making procedures are reserved for public offi97
cials. In other words, sincere reasons should be saved for an elite.
94. Bernard Williams argues for the necessity of consequentialism in politics, while acknowledging that the wrongness of the actions involved is not cancelled by their good consequences.
See Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 55 (Stu-

art Hampshire ed., 1978).
95. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 475-95 (Hackett Pub. Co., 1981) (1874).
This view has been criticized by Bernard Williams. See J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 138-40 (1973). It has also been discussed by Robert E.
Goodin. See ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 60-77 (1995);

Larry Alexander, Pursuingthe Good-Indirectly,95 ETHICS 315 (1985) (arguing that John Stuart
Mill's articulation between utilitarianism and libertarianism-which John Gray presents as indirect utilitarianism-comes down to "pursuing the good indirectly" and pointing out the troublesome consequences of such an argumentative structure).
96. Meir Dan-Cohen famously applied Government House utilitarianism to criminal law and
proposed that we distinguish between two kinds of rules: "decision rules," which are only
"heard" by public officials, and "conduct rules," which apply to ordinary citizens. See Meir DanCohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separationin Criminal Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 625, 625 (1984).

97. One can find a contemporary illustration of this attitude in the French judiciary. As
Mitchel Lasser has shown, the French judicial system is characterized by a "radical bifurcation"
between an official and an unofficial portrait of its practices. See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E.
LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY

AND LEGITIMACY 60-61 (2004). Officially, the French judicial opinion is presented as a syllo-

gism, which represents the mechanical application of statutes to particular cases. The French
legal elite, however-which is essentially composed of judges, law professors, and high-ranking
civil servants-knows that things are somewhat more complex in reality. Only they have access
to a "hidden" discourse. By reading the Advocates General's reports or by having discussions
with judges, they are able to perceive the policy choices that constantly underlie decisions despite official justifications to the contrary. See id.
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For the general public, simplified yet artificial reasons are to be preferred over sincere but intricate ones because most people would not
be able to live by refined and complicated rules. In this view, sincerity
is to be avoided when truthfulness would adversely affect the public or
would cause an undesired kind of behavior.
To summarize, many arguments that justify insincerity claim benevolence and concern for the deceived. Insincere reasons seem appealing because they are perceived as being without bias and as being told
in a disinterested wish to be helpful. The trouble with this line of argument is that it has an obvious paternalistic component. It illustrates
' 98
what Alvin Goldman has labeled "epistemic paternalism.
Goldman created the concept in the context of analyzing rules of evidence for jurors. He found that rules of evidence provide that some
types of evidence must be kept from jurors on the grounds that they
are likely to be misled by them. In this sense, rules of evidence are
designed to protect jurors from their own shortcomings. One can analyze disingenuous reason-giving in a similar fashion. But such paternalism conflicts with the fundamental purpose of requiring public
institutions to give reasons. Institutions are primarily required to give
reasons as a way to ensure their accountability towards the public.
Reasons are supposed to enable ordinary citizens to verify that public
officials are exercising their powers properly and not engaging in arbitrary decision making. Decisions justified by concealed or artificial
reasons would not really enable citizens to individually or collectively
decide whether to support or reject them. Being deprived of any
other access to decision makers' genuine reasons, the public may on
occasion be unable to effectively contest public decisions.
This analysis leads us back to the initial proposition that sincerity is
an indispensable aspect of the requirement to give reasons in democratic legal systems. And here again we arrive at the problem of determining whether sincerity is about disclosing justificatory or
motivating reasons for a decision. Before going any further, therefore, we must clarify what it means for a decision maker to be sincere
about his reasons. 99
98. Alvin 1. Goldman, Epistemic Paternalism:Communication Control in Law and Society, 88
J. PHIL. 113, 119 (1991) (defining epistemic paternalism in the following way: "I shall think of
communication controllers as exercising epistemic paternalism whenever they interpose their
own judgment rather than allow the audience to exercise theirs...").
99. As Micah Schwartzman has pointed out, the debate about judicial candor is too often
obscured by the use of confused and undefined concepts. While Schwartzman undertakes to
advance the discussion by distinguishing the concept of sincerity from that of candor, my contribution focuses on sincerity and shows that this single notion is liable for very different interpretations. See Schwartzman, supra note 32.
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TRACING THE CONTOURS OF THE REQUIREMENT
OF SINCERITY

The goal of this Part is normative. Drawing on the existing literature concerning the merits and demerits of sincerity, I undertake to
trace the contours of what the sincerity requirement should be in a
democratic legal system. What does it mean to give sincere reasons to
justify a decision in a legal setting? Much legal scholarship of the past
twenty years has been built around the usual assumption, which has
informed the discussions on judicial candor, that there are two possible normative stances: advocating candor and justifying lying.
This Article, in contrast, suggests a more nuanced approach that
accounts for a whole range of intermediary positions. I proceed by
presenting two main readings of sincerity-the "internalist" and the
"externalist"-which can be further refined by distinguishing between
three levels of "motivational" sincerity. Next, I further spell out my
proposal by introducing the relevance of the institutional context for
assessing sincerity. My purpose in this Part is therefore to discuss the
extent to which the requirement to give reasons should be understood
as externalist or internalist. In what follows, I assess the respective
advantages and disadvantages of adopting either one of these analyses
to the exclusion of the other.
A.

Two Readings of the Sincerity Requirement

A sincerity requirement in the law could presumably take one of
two forms: on a strong or internalist reading, it would require a congruence between actual motives and stated reasons, whereas on a less
demanding, externalist reading, it would only require an articulation
of sufficient stated reasons. At first, when reflecting on the requirement to give reasons in the public domain, it seems obvious that the
internalist reading prevails: what is demanded of state actors is that
they give the reasons that actually motivated them when making a
decision, in the sense that they must state the reasons that in fact
guided their reasoning in making a decision. In other words, it is expected that the normative reasons public officials put forward to justify their decisions are also their motivating reasons for picking a
particular solution. The legal duty to give reasons is often, as a matter
of positive law, an internalist duty to give reasons.
Let us step back and illustrate the problem. In January 2004, Tariq
Ramadan, a well-known scholar of Islam and a Swiss citizen, accepted
an offer to become a tenured professor at the University of Notre
Dame, Indiana. However, in July of that year, one week before Pro-
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fessor Ramadan's scheduled move to Notre Dame, the American Embassy in Switzerland revoked his visa. Consular officials did not
provide any explanation for the revocation. 100 Consequently, Ramadan resigned from his position at Notre Dame. The following year, he
reapplied on several occasions for a visa to enter the United States for
short periods of time in order to attend academic events. For months,
no decision was made on Ramadan's visa application. As a result, on
January 25, 2006, Professor Ramadan filed a lawsuit challenging his
ongoing exclusion from the United States with the assistance of several American organizations, including the American Academy of Religion, the American Association of University Professors, and the
10 1
PEN American Center.
Finally, on September 19, 2006, after months of unexplained delay
in the proceedings, Ramadan was notified by telephone that his visa
petition had been denied. He later received the following letter from
10 2
John Kinder, a consular official in Bern:
Dear Mr. Ramadan,
Your application for a B1/B2 non-immigrant visa has been refused.
You have been found inadmissible to the United States for engaging
in terrorist activity by providing material support to a terrorist organization. Please see sections 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) and 212(a)(3)(B)
(iv)(VI) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (attached).
The basis for this determination includes the fact that during your
two interviews with consular officials, you stated that you had made
100. The only reason the government gave for its denial of Professor Ramadan's visa is the
unofficial one that was reported in the Los Angeles Times and given by Russ Knocke, a spokesman for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), namely, that Professor Ramadan had "endorse[d] or espouse[d] terrorist activity." See Associated Press, Muslim Scheduled to Teach at Notre Dame Has Visa Revoked, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at A23. Spokesman Knocke further declared that the basis of the revocation was a provision of the PATRIOT Act, which permits the United States to exclude foreigners
who use a "position of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse a terrorist activity."
Id. On the Ramadan case generally, see also U.S.-Barred Muslim Scholar Joins Key British Task
Force, REUTERS, Sept. 1, 2005. For Ramadan's own opinion about the affair, see Tariq Ramadan, Information Items: Straightfrom the Source, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.tariqramadan.com/
article.php3?id.article=0424&varrecherche=task+force (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
101. In American Academy of Religion v. Chertoff, 463 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the
court ordered the government to issue a formal decision on Ramadan's pending visa application
within ninety days. Judge Paul A. Crotty, who wrote the opinion, argued that the government
may not invoke "national security" as a protective shroud to justify the exclusion of
aliens on the basis of their political beliefs ....
If Ramadan is a threat to national
security, or there is some other facially legitimate and bona fide reason for his exclusion, the Government may exclude him. But the Government must provide an explanation. It has not done so.
Id. at 419.
102. American Academy of Religion v. Chertoff, No. 06CV-588 (PAC), 2007 WL 4527504, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007).
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donations to the Comit6 de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens and the Association de Secours Palestinien. Donations to
these organizations, which you knew, or reasonably should have
known, provided funds to Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization, made you inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)
(I). Under U.S. law, this ineligibility is permanent and you will be
unable to enter the United States in the near future unless the ineligibility is waived in accordance with INA Sec. 212(d)(3).
Yours sincerely,
(original signature)
John 0. Kinder
Consul
US Embassy Bern
Upon reading the letter, Ramadan and his supporters amended the
complaint to challenge the decision on the ground that the government's proffered reason for denying the visa was not "facially legitimate and bona fide" as required by case law. 10 3 The complaint further
contended that the official reason for Ramadan's exclusion-that he
engaged in terrorist activity by providing material support to a terrorist organization-was supplied in bad faith and unsubstantiated by
facts. In particular, the complaint pointed out that the Association de
Secours Palestinien (ASC) was not considered to be a terrorist group
by the United States between 1998 and 2002, when Ramadan made
his donations. Only on August 21, 2003, a year after Ramadan made
his last donation, did the U.S. Department of Treasury list ASC as an
entity supporting terrorism because it provided funding to Hamas. In
addition, the plaintiffs argued that the government had failed to
demonstrate that Ramadan "knew," in the sense required by the law,
that he was supporting terrorism by making donations to this
organization.
The Ramadan case raises the question of whether the "facially legitimate" reason standard should allow State Department officials to
present grounds for denying entry to the United States which differ
from the actual reasons underlying the decision. If it should, bureaucrats would be entitled to publicly give any acceptable reason, while
actually making their determinations based on other-perhaps odious
or simply frivolous-considerations. In this hypothesis, the requirement for public officials to give reasons would be disconnected from
103. The complaint was amended on February 2, 2007. The "facially legitimate and bona
fide" standard has been articulated in Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 753 (1972). It requires that when a consular official denies a visa, which implicates a U.S. citizen's First Amendment rights, he must have a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for doing so. Id. at 770.
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the question of whether or not they have any acceptable motivation
for their decisions.
As the Ramadan case illustrates, the nature and the extent of the
disclosure triggered by the requirement is unclear in practice. In the
Ramadan case, is the reason-giving requirement an externalist requirement? That is, is it a requirement for consular officers to give
the reasons for or against a given decision, independently of whether
or not they are motivated by these reasons? If so, the Bern consular
officer was sincere-provided that he believed the reason he gave in
his letter. Or is it an internalist requirement, that is, a requirement for
decision makers to give the reasons that both exist and motivate
them? If so, the consular officer was insincere because he was (presumably) not motivated by the reason he gave. Allowing State Department officers to present grounds for denying visas that differ from
the actual reasons underlying their determinations amounts to adopting an externalist requirement. According to this understanding, the
rule is that deciders must state the justificatory reasons that exist in
favor of their proposed solutions, rather than recounting the reasons
that motivated or justified their decision. The presumption is that
when public officials give reasons, they state the reasons that they
think there are in favor of the outcome. The assumption is not that
they state what their actual reasons were in favor of the decisions.
Hence decision makers are not necessarily lying when stating justificatory reasons that do not, in fact, motivate them.
In sum, the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard raised in
the Ramadan case, by including the requirement that the reasons disclosed be "bona fide," seems to say that the government cannot lie
about its motivations. But the mere fact that the reasons supplied are
not the reasons that motivated the decision does not in and of itself
mean that they are not good reasons or undermine their capacity to
justify. 1°4 If it is true that Ramadan supports terrorism, then this fact
remains a good reason for justifying his exclusion, even if it turns out
that the State Department had based its decision on another consideration. Therefore, if it is legally a sufficient ground, then why worry
about the subjective motivations? Suppose we find out that consular
officers denied Ramadan's visa because they are islamophobes. Even
104. Richard Wasserstrom famously argues that it would be pointless to criticize a judicial
opinion based on its failure to provide an adequate description of the decision-making process
because the purpose of a legal justification is not to reveal the way in which the decision was
reached, but is instead to demonstrate that a decision is valid in light of existing authority. See
RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 28-29 (1961).
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if this were the case, they would have justified their rejection based on
a valid reason (as a matter of law). The Immigration and Nationality
Act indeed states that visas are to be denied to applicants who are
engaged in terrorist activity. 10 5 Why care about their subjective motivation if the publicly given justification is legally valid? In other
words, if there is a legally good reason for denying the visa, namely,
that Ramadan did provide financial support to a terrorist group, then
why bother about what the decision makers really thought?
The internalist understanding is problematic for several reasons.
First, this interpretation of the standard overlooks the fact that sincere
speech is speech that reflects the speaker's beliefs, but not necessarily
all of them. A question that decision makers need to resolve is the
following: of all of the things they could say to justify a given decision,
what should they say? When it comes to institutions, these issues are
particularly complicated because what institutional actors say is often
determined by what they are required to say. And they are usually
not required to tell the whole truth, in the sense of disclosing all of
their beliefs, views, or preferences on the matter.
Institutionalized reason-giving is very similar to familiar social interactions that are governed by rituals and codes of politeness. These
are situations in which the usual assumptions we make about the connection between what people say and what they believe or feel are
suspended. Certain questions, for example, are not real questions.
You are not supposed to reply to a neighbor's, "How are you?" in the
elevator, with an endless account of your psyche. Similarly, certain
answers do not pretend to be real answers. They are exempted from
truth-value. When you politely reply to your neighbor's inquiry, "I
am fine. How are you?," you are not making any promise that what
you say is true, or even that you think it is true. Your neighbor is not
expecting you to do so either. Truth is irrelevant here. As a result,
you are not being insincere even if in fact you are feeling awfully
poorly.
Institutions often function on the same principle; much institutional
legal reason-giving is intended to have symbolic value, rather than
true-value. For the purposes of the argument, I only want to suggest
that whether a public official's statement of reasons is sincere is often
a matter of particular institutional design. As a result, there is no
sincerity problem if a given institution makes it clear that its official
statements should not be subjected to the same truth-value standards
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006).
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as regular speech. If the public knows what kind of reasons to expect,
they will not be misled.
For instance, to go back to the Ramadan case, whether the consular
officer states the motivating reason for his decision to deny Ramadan's application, or rather, a justificatory reason to bar Ramadan,
depends on what he has a duty to say. If the duty is a duty to disclose
motives, then he is insincere if the reason he gave was not his motivating reason. If the duty is a duty to state reasons that justify the decision, then he is only insincere if he does not believe that the reasons
he gave justify the decision.
Second, the internalist reading of the bona fide clause suggests that
the requirement to give reasons has an epistemic component built into
it, in the sense that it calls for an evaluation of the decider's state of
mind. Yet it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain
whether governmental agents are telling the truth or lying when they
are their justifying decisions. Part of the problem is that individuals'
actual motivations are often contradictory or at least confused, so they
can hardly be used alone to construct what it means for reasons to be
sincere. 10 6 Furthermore, it is a major question in contemporary philosophy of mind how exactly one can access one's own mental states
and those of others, such as beliefs, memories, desires, motivations,
and so on. 10 7 Individuals seem to have privileged epistemic access to
0 8 If
their own mental states, but not to other people's mental states.'
this appearance is correct, it is unlikely that public officials' justificatory reasons can be monitored based on their inaccessible motives.
How is possible to verify whether their avowed reasons accurately re106. As Nicholas Zeppos puts it in the context of examining judicial reason-giving,
[Tihe complexity of the process may also belie the notion that the judge can separate
out the "false" reasons for a decision ... from the "real" reasons.... As much as any
other product of human decisionmaking, the judge's work is subject to the complex
ways in which the human mind orders, explains and processes information.
Zeppos, supra note 35, at 407.
107. On this debate, see generally Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling
More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. Rpv. 231 (1977)
(arguing that there may not even be direct introspective access to our own higher-order cognitive processes, let alone to that of others). See also NED BLOCK ET AL., THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES (1997); DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS
EXPLAINED (1991); William Alston, Varieties of Privileged Access, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 223 (1971);
Tyler Burge, Individualism and Self-Knowledge, 85 J. PHIL. 649 (1988); Alison Gopnik, How Do
We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-PersonKnowledge of Intentionality, 16 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 1 (1993).

108. Of course, this view could be challenged on the ground that mental states are physical
states of some sort, like neurophysiologic states of the brain. As such, they would be publicly
accessible. In this hypothesis, one could know a host of things about other people's mental
states, just like one can know things about their hair color, their height, their weight, and so on.
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flect their underlying motivations? The most promising ground for
determining their subjective motives is their own testimony. However, this seems a very weak basis.
This accessibility issue, however, does not necessarily present a
problem, for it can be argued that the epistemological difficulty of accessing public officials' beliefs is irrelevant to the legitimacy of the
requirement not to lie. From the epistemic fact that it is seldom possible to discover decision makers' subjective motives, it should not follow that public officials have permission to lie about their reasons.
Otherwise, following the same logic, one could argue that because it is
impossible to access other human beings' mental states, lying is morally permissible. The point here is that it is necessary to give an account of reason-giving within the legal process that clarifies the
relationship between the normative requirement to give sincere reasons and the epistemological question of ascertaining what those reasons are. At this juncture, I will make no attempt to work out these
complex epistemological issues, which would take us too far afield.
Rather, and as a means of further introducing the ensuing analysis, I
will now consider in more detail the different forms that the sincerity
requirement can take in the law.
B.

The "Internalist" View: Sincerity Requires a Correspondence
Between Reasons and Motives

The externalist proposal enjoys some initial plausibility, but some
readers may be unconvinced by the idea that the law should treat normative reasons as entirely independent of whether a decider is motivated by them. According to the internalist, the externalist
mistakenly allows decision makers to display some degree of negligence with respect to what the public ultimately believes. 10 9 She objects that in the externalist analysis, there is nothing to prevent public
institutions from misrepresenting their reasons for a decision and,
therefore, from operating with indifference as to whether the public is
deceived.
109. In this regard, the internalist might object-mistakenly in my view-that the externalist
account does not rule out "bullshit," in Harry Frankfurt's terms. According to Frankfurt, bullshitting involves not the intent to get others to believe something one knows is false, but rather
indifference to the truth-value of our statements. See FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT, supra note 26,
at 54-56. In other words, the only intent behind misrepresentations is an intent to neither report
the truth faithfully nor to conceal it. See id. But the internalist would be incorrect in claiming
that externalism fails to rule out bullshitting because to meet external sincerity a decision maker
must provide what she believes is a sufficient justificatory reason. The decision maker is making
a truth claim about that reason, namely, that it is sufficient to justify the outcome. The decision
maker is not-and could not be-indifferent, at least not with respect to that truth anyway.
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To illustrate, one could think of cases in which failure to disclose
one of the relevant reasons may be designed to leave the wrong impression about what has been said. It may result in obscuring some
objective-something the deceived citizen wanted to do or obtain, for
example, by making the objective seem unattainable or no longer desirable. For instance, in most countries, consular officers routinely
deny visas on the basis that applicants have not presented proof of
sufficient funding to support their residency. This explanation, however, is not always exhaustive, in the sense that officers may abstain
from disclosing other operative reasons for denial, such as diplomatic
or security-based considerations. The trouble is that those undisclosed factors will lead to the future visa denials in case of re-application. Unsuccessful applicants may go out of their way to collect
documents such as bank statements, scholarship award letters, letters
from employers, and so on, hoping to prove that they have sufficient
funding at their disposal, only to see their application rejected yet
again. Had they known that the deciding factor was not limited to the
criterion of financial resources, they might have acted differently, for
example, by applying for a different visa or by modifying their travel
plans altogether.
An externalist might object to this description of the situation. He
could point out that the correct way of depicting the case is to say that
there were in fact two independent justificatory reasons for the visa
denial and that the officer chose to disclose only one. 110 This is why
the applicants did not realize that they might not obtain their visa
even if they re-applied after having met the requirements. According
to the externalist, the problem stems not from externalism, but from
the absence of a comprehensive requirement to give reasons, that is,
of a requirement to give all the justificatory reasons applicable to any
given case. Such a requirement would be perfectly compatible with
externalism.
The internalist reply is that when decision makers offer a reason for
their decision, that reason must be offered from within their own epistemic and moral perspective. But what is such a perspective? An
internalist would answer that they should "believe" the reason or be
committed to it in some way. It is unclear though what she means by
"believing a reason" or "being committed to a reason." In my opinion, the best way to understand the phrase is to take it to mean that
decision makers should be committed to the view that the reasons
110. This situation is analogous to that which has been described in the literature as the
"mixed motive" analysis in judicial review of legislation. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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they are giving are truly justifying reasons. But once again this interpretation is entirely compatible with externalism.
By contrast, it sometimes seems as if internalists take the phrase to
mean-mistakenly in my view-that a decision maker acknowledges
that a particular consideration tipped the balance in favor of the outcome in the decision-making process. To believe a reason in this sense
is to treat it as a deciding factor, that is, to recognize it as the basis for
a particular decision. If the decision maker did not actually rely on
the reason in question while deciding, then he does not "believe" it, or
is not committed to it, in the required sense.
Suppose once again that an administrator denies a construction permit to a landowner for a well on the basis that the well would result in
groundwater contamination. 1 ' This reason is deceptive if the administrator really decided against the permit based solely on aesthetic impact. The administrator picked contamination as a reason simply
because it is an easy ground to prove, whereas it is much harder to
produce sufficient aesthetic evidence to substantiate the denial. The
justification remains deceptive even if it turns out that in fact the well
would have a detrimental impact on the groundwater because this fact
did not play any role in the administrator's decision. The question I
ask to the internalist, then, is whether there must be a certain intentional correspondence between what one believes and what one says
one believes, that is, between our conscious commitments and our
stated reasons.
Robert Audi's theory illustrates the internalist point of view on
sincerity. In the context of discussing the separation of church and
state, he argues for an internalist requirement of sincerity: to be sincere, he claims, the reasons that a representative of the state gives
must be motivational. 1' 2 Imagine a judge who personally opposes
abortion because she "believes that zygotes are ensouled by God at
the moment of conception and believes so on ecclesiastical authority."' 113 However, she justifies her support of legally restricting abortion based not on this controversial belief but on secular arguments
related to the value of human life and the protection of the innocent.
The reason she puts forward seems perfectly capable of justifying her
position, but is it sincere? The reason does not motivate her. Accord111. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
112. See ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000); Robert
Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason: A Reply to Professor Weithman, 20 PHIL. &
PUB. AEF. 66 (1991).
113. I borrow this example from Paul J. Weithman, The Separation of Church and State: Some
Questions for Professor Audi, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFe. 52, 59 (1991).
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ing to Audi, it is therefore an insincere reason. In his view, a reason is
sincere if and only if one is motivated by it. In the example just mentioned, the judge's decision is motivated by a religious belief, but it is
rationalizable by appeal to secular reasons.
Audi defends his internalist vision of sincerity on a moral basis. He
argues that there is something disrespectful in trying to move others
by what does not motivate oneself: "[T]here is a certain lack of respect
implied in seeking my agreement to a policy by offering reasons by
which one is not oneself moved."' 14 In putting forward reasons that
one does not find adequate but that one supposes others will accept,
one assumes that others have lower standards. This moral justification of internalist reason-giving is certainly appealing, but I doubt that
sincerity can be understood on such demanding lines in the legal setting where reasons are highly institutionalized. As I said before, the
reasons we are dealing with in the law are formalized reasons inthe
sense that they are embedded within the legal system. They are socially and institutionally constructed reasons. Legal reasons should
not be held to the same standards as the reasons people give each
other outside of any such institutionalized context. Suffice it to say,
for the purposes of the present argument, that when public institutions
give reasons that are not fully motivational, it does not automatically
mean that they are disrespecting the citizenry. On the contrary, the
very fact of giving reasons, even if the reasons are less than candid
reasons, may be conceived of as a symbolic act of respect in many
socio-legal contexts. For the sake of the present discussion, I will
therefore leave aside the moral justification of reason-giving and focus
on the conceptual analysis of what should count as a sincere reason in
the law.
The internalist account of sincere reason-giving may be criticized on
the ground that it is impracticable in the law. According to the internalist perspective, to be qualified as sincere, a statement of reasons
must represent full disclosure of the decision maker's motivational set.
Justificatory reasons ought not only to reflect one's underlying motivation; they must also do so exhaustively. To put it somewhat differently, according to this view, a decision maker is sincere if and only if
she discloses all of the considerations that, she believes, explain the
decision. As such, sincerity involves the duty to reveal all of one's
reasons, in the sense of making public all the considerations, motivational and justificatory, that bear on the decision.
114. See Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligation of Citizenship,
18 PHIL. & PUB. AF. 259, 283 (1989).

1132

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1091

This approach calls for an enterprise that is both impossible and
undesirable. It is impossible because virtually all of the things that
comprise an agent's motivational set-such as beliefs, commitments,
desires, memories, goals, and so on-influence to some extent any decision she makes. If the thought that sincerity requires full disclosure
is taken seriously, decision makers would be obligated to meticulously
recite the incredibly long list of considerations that have affected their
decision in one way or another. Not only would this be impracticable
in terms of time and resource constraints, but it would also be awfully
tedious. Imagine having to read or to write decisions compiling so
many facts that the important pieces of information would disappear
in a sea of details. In short, public reason-giving is not-and should
not be-intended to produce an exhaustive record of decision makers'
thought processes in reaching a decision.
Audi's argument is appealing, but it is too stringent for the legal
setting. It fails to account for cases in which the reason-giver states a
reason that partially motivates her in the sense that she also has another, undisclosed motive for the decision. In such contexts, the decision maker may consider that a given normative reason is adequate to
justify her decision, yet she makes the decision at least partly for another motivating reason. She might accept the reason she gives abstractly and offer it out of a sense of commitment to the ideal of public
justification, but her specific reason for making the decision is
different.
In the light of this, let us reconsider the externalist proposal and
assess whether it better accounts for the need of sincerity in legal
justification.
C.

The "Externalist" View: Only Justificatory Reasons Are Relevant

One way of defending the externalist proposal consists in pointing
out that being motivated by a consideration is not what makes it a
good reason: reasons obtain independently of motivation. Law is concerned with good, justificatory reasons, not with policing actual motivations. 1 15 What matters is that decision makers can justify their
decisions based on good reasons that are acceptable by the public at
115. In making that statement, I am endorsing a broadly positivistic understanding of the law
as not necessarily connected with morality. One of the defining features of the legal positivist
understanding of law is the insistence on the separation of law and morality. In other words,
state or private action may be legal, yet immoral, and vice versa, depending on the extent to
which it is based on legal rules that are recognized as valid within the particular legal system in
question. On this debate, see generally RAZ, supra note 69; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
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large. Law is not in the business of regimenting mental states. Conformity to law is an external matter, not an internal matter, in the
sense that abiding citizens' intentions are immaterial from the legal
standpoint: so long as they obey the law, their underlying motivations
for doing so are not a matter of concern. From this perspective,
sincerity, understood as the correspondence between one's justificatory and one's motivating reasons, is beside the point for a legal analysis of reason-giving.
According to the externalist, what makes a difference in the law are
the reasons that are actually given, not the motivating reasons that
were purportedly held by the decision makers at the time when they
made the decision. In the long run, the externalist argues, citizens are
left with the justificatory reasons that are officially given, not with the
motivations that actually moved decision makers, because only the
former are overtly announced and make it into the public record. Ordinary citizens are usually not admitted to the non-public debates occurring among governmental agents prior to the pronouncement of
their decisions. One cannot read into the minds of the decision makers. As a result, the quest for discrepancies between justifying and
motivating reasons seems to be most often doomed to failure. It
would come down to alleging uncertain and hypothetical divergences
that can never be firmly established.
This predicament does not only affect ordinary, lay citizens. Habitually, governmental agents themselves rely on justificatory reasons
that are officially recorded rather than on an insider's perspective on
their colleagues' motivating reasons. The kind of institutional design
commonly found in democratic regimes explains this reliance. Life
tenures are rare, despite notorious exceptions like the United States
Supreme Court.1 1 6 Rotating tenures, limited terms of office, periodic
reelection, and other similar mechanisms mean that public institutions' personnel are renewed regularly. At any given period of time,
public officials serving at a public institution will solely have access to
the past justificatory reasons for most of that organization's decisions,
not to past motivations. Decision makers' knowledge of their colleagues' motives is limited because they were not-and are not always-present behind the scenes when each and every decision is
made. In short, not unlike laypersons, public officials ultimately have
116. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 770, 772 (2005) (calling for a change to the
life tenure rule for Supreme Court justices and advocating instead the institution of a system of
staggered, eighteen-year term limits for justices).
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guaranteed access to officially publicized public decisions, not to motivating reasons for those decisions.
This externalist approach has the advantage of doing away with the
problem of uncovering decision makers' motivations. If the externalist is right, we need not worry about motivating reasons. By contrast,
the internalist view-according to which the requirement to give reasons is a requirement for decision makers to provide justifying reasons
that are also their motivating reasons-runs into an enforceability
problem. It is hard to fathom what enforcement mechanism could be
used in practice to ensure compliance with the internalist demand. To
verify that decision makers have provided sincere reasons for their
decisions, we would need to be able to compare the reasons they gave
with their motivational state at the time when they made their decision. And here we once again encounter the issue of gaining access to
decision makers' mental states.' 17 In an attempt to avoid the problem,
internalists may concede that we lack direct access to public officials'
motivations, but they maintain that there are indirect methods of discovering people's motives. The internalist could argue that there are
reliable ways of ascertaining motivations, for example, by engaging in
private conversations or interviews with decision makers, by regularly
reading their work if they happen to publish, by closely reading all of
their public and official statements to acquire a better picture of their
way of thinking, and so on.
An externalist could object that even if such indirect inquiries may
occasionally shed some useful light on the decision-making process,
their results are far too unpredictable and unreliable to constitute the
proper basis for an efficient enforcement mechanism. Moreover, he
could point out that, even supposing that we could gain sufficient access to motivations, it does not follow that documenting the alleged
discrepancy between motivating reasons and justificatory reasons can
do any useful work. In the end, the only reasons that have precedential value are those that are publicly and officially given. Only these
reasons are published and read by the legal community and by the
public at large. Most importantly, only those reasons have binding
authority over other public institutions, present and future. Public institutions are dynamic, evolving entities; as such, they have a history,
and future members will presumably only have access to official reasons of past members, not to undisclosed motivations. To some extent, it is therefore irrelevant whether the decision makers in charge

117. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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had a hidden agenda behind their overt justification because the only
reasons that become part of the law are the ones officially given.
To sum up, in these hypotheses, a decision maker has given a justificatory reason that also motivates him, but not fully. Is the reason ipso
facto insincere? I do not think so. My view is that the given reason
should not count as insincere so long as the reason-giver regards it as
adequately supporting the decision. Conversely, if the reason-giver
does not regard the given reason as supporting the decision in any
way, then the presentation of it as a justificatory reason seems manipulative. In what follows, I further develop this approach and begin the
process of formulating an account of the kind of motivational requirement that the law should tie to the reason-giving requirement.
D.

What Kinds of Motivational Requirements for Sincerity?

The preceding discussion comes down to this simple question: are
motives relevant to sincerity? The importance we ought to accord to
motivation in evaluations of sincerity in the law remains to be determined. It is still unclear, in other words, whether the assessment of a
decision maker's sincerity should be connected to that person's motivational set. Irrespective of one's answer to that question, however,
one may speculate about the desirability of implementing several versions of a motivational component into the reason-giving requirement,
in the sense of requiring some degree of correspondence between
one's avowed reasons and one's motives. This motivational requirement can be understood in different ways, depending on two factors,
which are exhaustivity and plausibility (in the sense of justificatory
status).
In what follows, I propose that we distinguish between three levels
of what I call "motivational sincerity" in reason-giving. The three
levels can be used to describe different motivational requirementsfrom the most demanding to the most lenient-that legal systems may
choose to implement. In differentiating these standards, I am following a typology that David Reidy has developed in the context of discussing Rawls's ideal of public reason and its potential conflict with
sincerity. 118 The following table illustrates three possible dimensions:

118. See David A. Reidy, Rawls's Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough, 6
PUBLICA

49, 61 (2000).
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TABLE 1
THREE LEVELS OF MOTIVATIONAL SINCERITY
Exhaustive Motivational
Sincerity
The justificatory reasons
must track all the underlying
motives,

Partial Motivational
Sincerity
The justificatory reasons
must track at least one of
the underlying motives,

Counterfactual Motivational
Sincerity
The justificatory reasons
must be such that they could
be a motive for the decision.

Exhaustive Motivational Sincerity. For decision makers to be con-

sidered sincere, the strictest motivation requirement demands that
they be motivated by the very justificatory reasons they give. There
must be a perfect correspondence between their justificatory and their
motivating reasons. In this perspective, a given proposition is a sincere reason only when the decider believes that proposition to be true,
endorses its adequacy as a reason for making the decision, and is committed to responding in appropriate ways if the proposition in question proves to be an inadequate reason.
Partial Motivational Sincerity. For decision makers to be deemed

sincere, a less rigorous standard demands that they be motivated by at
least some of the reasons they give. Here, there must be only a partial
overlap between their justificatory and motivating reasons. Thus, the
reasons public officials put forward need not reflect all of their underlying motives. According to this standard, sincere statements of reasons allow for non-disclosure of some of the considerations that
motivated the decision. A statement of reasons may be sincere but
incomplete.
CounterfactualMotivational Sincerity. The weakest motivational re-

quirement is counterfactual: it demands that decision makers be capable of imagining that they could be motivated by the reasons they
give. Public officials need not be actually motivated by the justificatory reasons they put forward; potential motivation suffices. Here, the
only correspondence required between public officials' justificatory
and motivating reasons is a counterfactual one. The justificatory reasons must be such that at least in one possible world decision makers
could have been motivated by them. In short, to be sincere, reasons
must only pass a counterfactual motivational test. The discrepancy
between the justifying and the motivating reasons is not aimed at deluding the public. To satisfy the weak sincerity requirement, it is suffi-
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cient for a statement of reasons to disclose just enough information so
as to prevent others from being misled.1 1 9
Which of these three standards provides the best normative model
for the requirement to give reasons in the law? Certainly, whenever
there can be perfect correspondence between justificatory and normative reasons, it is better than not. In other words, ideally, most instances of legal reason-giving should comply with the strictest
requirement. But the next question is which relationship should be
preferred when a perfect correspondence between justifying and motivating reasons is not guaranteed. I think that the weakest form of the
requirement sufficiently accounts for sincere reason-giving in the law.
In democratic regimes, the requirement to give reasons is best understood as demanding that decision makers justify decisions based on
justificatory reasons that they sincerely believe to be good and sufficient reasons for picking the outcome. There is nothing insincere, in
this view, about offering a justifying reason one believes to be sufficient while being motivated by another reason, for example, a reason
less likely to be accepted by others because it relies on controversial
beliefs. The weak requirement solely supposes, as David Reidy puts
it, that decision makers can at least imagine being motivated to act
120
from the justifying reason they give.
Compared to the externalist analysis of reason-giving, this
counterfactual requirement presents the advantage of not giving up
altogether on incorporating a motivational component into the reason-giving requirement. At the same time, it is sufficiently broad to
account for many cases in which we want to say that decision makers
are being sincere despite the fact that their justifying reasons and their
motivating reasons diverge. My conclusion so far is that the legal requirement to give reasons is best understood as including a minimal
motivational requirement. For public officials to fulfill the motivational component of the reason-giving requirement, they need only
sincerely believe that their decisions are justified by some normative
reason that they have in fact identified and that is in fact motivatingactually or potentially.
This conclusion, however, should be nuanced. Thus far I have proceeded mainly as if sincerity in the law could be evaluated across the
board, without paying attention to the specific features of different
decision-making contexts. In practice, however, the issue of sincerity
119. In this sense, the weak requirement endorses Bernard Williams's idea that sincerity consists of a disposition to make sure that one's assertion expresses what one actually believes. See
BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 96-100 (2002).
120. See Reidy, supra note 118, at 57.
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calls for consideration of certain features of context such as the institution's function within a given legal system or its decision-making
procedure. This allows for the possibility that different contexts set
different sincerity standards. For the rest of the Article, I hope to
remedy this oversimplification by singling out several important contextual factors that are liable to modify my assessment of sincerity.
V. THE

CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF SINCERITY

The existing literature on legal sincerity has failed to systematically
address the importance of institutional differences in assessing the
need for a sincerity requirement. 121 This Part argues, however, that
an analysis of sincerity requires much greater attention to context. I
claim that institutions and their specific features should be considered
as contextual determinants of sincerity in the law. Not all decision
makers and public institutions should be expected to comply with the
same identical standard of sincerity. Rather, I identify different mechanisms by which institutions may or may not promote distinctive patterns of behavior that lead to sincere reason-giving. Sincerity varies
across the board, based on different factors, such as the function performed by an institution-be it judicial, executive, legislative, political,
or administrative-and the internal functioning of the institution (for
example, whether decisions are made by individual or by collective
decision makers). I will say a few words about these two sets of factors so as to suggest how different contexts can be relevant to understanding the requirement to give sincere reasons.
A.

Contextual Sincerity Based on the Type of Institution

There is a world of difference between merely speaking on one's
own and being asked to speak on behalf of a given institution. In the
latter situation, a great deal surely depends on how the question is
asked and by whom. If the State Department is asked, "Is this the
reason why you denied Ramadan's visa?," this is a different matter
than asking someone randomly, in abstracto, "What reasons can you
give for denying Ramadan's visa?" The preceding analysis allows for
the creation of a general outline of the differing ways in which the
sincerity requirement might vary in its institutional applications.
121. There is one notable exception: while discussing judicial candor, Scott Idleman is highly
sensitive to the variable and contextual aspect of the concept. He points out that "[c]andor is by
nature a contextual, multivariable phenomenon, the value of which is primarily instrumental and
the propriety of which cannot be reduced to abstractions or absolutes." Idleman, supra note 35,
at 1399.
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There are important differences between judicial, executive, and
legislative speech, and they call for a fine-grained analysis of sincerity.
In some contexts, the sincerity standards are very high. In others, the
requirements are comparatively low. To illustrate, legal systems treat
the necessity and the importance of sincere reason-giving in judicial
dispute resolution much more seriously than in the enactment of statutes by legislatures or in policy making at the executive level. 122 Much
American legal theory has thus proceeded on the assumption that
public officials performing adjudicative functions should be held to a
123
stricter requirement of sincerity than other governmental agents.
Theorists like Lon Fuller have focused on the role of reasons in distinguishing appropriate judicial creativity from other forms of social
orderings. 124 Fuller thus declares,
Adjudication is, then, a device which gives formal and institutional
expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs.
As such it assumes a burden of rationality not borne by any other
form of social ordering.... We demand of an adjudicative decision
a kind of
rationality we do not expect of the results of contract or of
12 5
voting.
Considering that judicial decisions are reached within an institutional framework that is intended to assure to the disputants an opportunity for the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments,
these theorists have argued that judges ought to abide by a strict
sincerity requirement. Sincere reason-giving is considered critical in
the judicial setting for yet another reason. While governmental decisions, such as legislative and executive measures, are subject to citizen
control at the ballot box, the legitimacy of judges' pronouncements is
126
conditioned upon their ability to justify their law-creating power.
In the judicial context, a sincerity requirement works as a guarantee
122. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Defining JudicialInactivism: Models of Adjudication and the
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121 (2005). But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons
Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 20
(2001) (arguing that reason-giving is more important in administrative law than in judicial disputes). Mashaw further notes that "[a]dministrators must not only give reasons, they must give
complete ones. We insist that they be authentic by demanding that they be both transparent and
contemporaneous." Id. at 26.
123. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 807 (2000).

124. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 36.
125. Id. at 366-67.
126. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions As Binding Law and As Explanationfor Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 44-45 (1993) (arguing that the practice of giving reasons legitimizes the role of judges relative to other branches of government). But see Earl M. Malz, The
Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1395 (2000) (arguing that the legitimating function of Supreme Court opinions has been overstated).
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against the arbitrary. 127 If judges do not give sincere reasons for their
verdicts, it is much harder to determine whether they are acting properly, within the limits of their authority. This heightened expectation
explains why judges often give many reasons, sometimes without priority attached. The typical appellate court decision engages in a para-

128
taxis of reasons to legitimize the judicial function.
A similar point can be made concerning the difference between reason-giving in an administrative law-making context and in a legislative
law-making context. 129 In most contemporary democratic legal systems, administrative agencies are subject to relatively strict sincerity
requirements. 130 By contrast, legislatures are not held to any sincerity
requirement1 31 because they are traditionally under no obligation to
127. As Judge Posner puts it, giving reasons filters out arbitrariness insofar as some decisions
simply "won't write" because the process of drafting an opinion reveals insuperable flaws in
reasoning. See Richard Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (and Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1421, 1447 (1995) ("Reasoning that seemed sound when 'in the head' may seem half-baked
when written down, especially since the written form of an argument encourages some degree of
critical detachment in the writer, who in reading what he has written will be wondering how an
audience would react."). For a critical discussion of the common view that writing, as an act of
committing reasons to paper, makes for better decisions, see Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition and the Nature of the JudicialFunction, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283 (2008) (applying recent psychological studies on the relationship between verbalization, writing, thought, and decision making to
the judicial context, and arguing that writing opinions is not always an unqualified way of increasing the quality of judicial decisions).
128. See generally Joel Levin, The Concept of the JudicialDecision, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
208 (1983).
129. See Mashaw, supra note 122, at 19-26 (describing contrasts among the role of reasons in
judicial review of agency action, legislation, and judicial decisions).
130. On the administrative duty to give reasons, see generally Paul P. Craig, The Common
Law, Reasons and Administrative Justice, 53 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 282, 283-84 (1994) (considering,
from a comparative law perspective, recent developments in the common law in relation to the
duty of public authorities to provide reasons); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened
Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons
for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387 (examining how the evolution of judicial review of
agency decisions has reflected changing political values in American government). The most
prominent statutorily defined reason-giving requirement in law is undoubtedly the American
Administrative Procedure Act's requirement that informal rules be accompanied by a "concise
general statement of their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988). For a general analysis
of the reason-giving requirement in American administrative law, see MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO
GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION

(1988);

MARTIN SHAPIRO

& ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION (2002); Jerry L. Mashaw, Rea-

soned Administration, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 105-12 (2007); Martin Shapiro, Administrative
Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487 (1983); Shapiro, supra note 18.
131. There is arguably an important qualification to this exemption in American constitutional law, which often relies on motive analysis. In certain areas of constitutional adjudication
such as equal protection and substantive due process, legislation can be struck down by courts on
the ground that legislators have enacted a given statute based on illegitimate motives. For scholarship on motive analysis in constitutional law, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 136-45 (1980); Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15

SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925 (1978); Brest, supra note 8; Theodore Eisenberg, DisproportionateIn-

2010]

SINCERITY AND REASON-GIVING

1141

give any reason at all to justify legislation. 132 American administrators must not only give reasons, they must also give authentic ones.
The established rule, formulated in SEC v. Chenery, is that a reviewing court may uphold an agency's action only on the grounds upon
which the agency relied when it acted. 133 American courts thus routinely refuse to consider agencies' "post-hoc rationalizations"1 34 or attempts to rely on implicit agency expertise1 35 as adequate, sincere
reason-giving.
By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court regularly upholds legislation
on grounds other than those stated by Congress or the relevant states'
legislatures. 136 Under the "rational basis" test, which is the default
standard governing the review of legislative acts, 137 the constitutional
question is simply whether some state of affairs might be imagined
pact and Illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv.36 (1977); Ely,
supra note 47, at 1207-12; Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Daniel R. Ortiz, The
Myth of Intent in Equal Protection,41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1989). For a recent examination of motive analysis, see Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review,
17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 191 (2008).

132. For a detailed analysis of this contrast in the United States, see Kevin M. Stack, The
Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007). Stacks points out that
"[a]dministrative agencies may act with the force of law, but their obligations to give reasons for
their decisions are very different from those that apply to Congress or the federal courts." Id. at
955. For a classic statement of the legislative prerogative, see A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-4 (Liberty Fund, 1982) (1885). See also Philip

B. Kurkland, Toward a PoliticalSupreme Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 19, 29 (1969) (characterizing
the legislative prerogative as the power to "create rules without the need for justifying them").
133. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (establishing the principle that a
court may uphold an agency's action only for the reasons the agency expressly relied upon when
it acted); Konan v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005) (reaffirming in the
immigration context the bedrock principle of administrative law that judicial review of an
agency's decision is limited to the rationale that the agency provides, and concluding that a
reviewing court is powerless to decide in the first instance issues that an agency did not reach).
See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (providing the classic formulation for
this principle: "[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the
agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its actions can be sustained"). "The
grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record
discloses that its action was based." Id. at 87.
134. The iconic statement of this position is found in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971). For a contextual analysis of Overton, see, for example, PETER L. STRAUSS, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe-Of Politics and Law, Young Lawyers and the Highway Goliath, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 258 (2006).

135. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
136. One can find a paradigmatic formulation of the American constitutional rule according
to which Congress is not required to give reasons in United States Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
137. Of course, the "rational basis" standard is only the default test-not the only test -that
governs review of legislative acts. A whole range of legislative provisions are examined under
stricter scrutiny.
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under which a state regulation would be a rational means to carry out
a certain goal.138 A statute is unconstitutional only in those exceedingly rare cases in which no rational argument can be constructed to
justify the result. 139 For example, in McGowan v. Maryland, the Court
upheld a Maryland statute that prohibited the sale of most merchandise on Sundays, yet at the same time, permitted the sale of certain
items, such as tobacco, alcoholic beverages, newspapers, gasoline, and
medicine, as well as souvenirs, flowers, and toilet goods, declaring that
"[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.''140 It is hard to imagine a

141
reason more minimal than that.
In sum, statutes are subject only to the constraint of hypothetical
reason, that is, to counterfactual analysis. This example and the previous ones demonstrate that depending on the institution under consideration, the motivational requirement associated with the practice of
reason-giving is more or less rigorous. But while the U.S. Supreme
Court merely subjects federal and state statutes to a weak, counterfactual motivational requirement, it imposes a stronger constraint on administrative regulations.
This contextual analysis could be pursued much further. The need
for sincerity might also vary within each branch of government based
on the specific institution under consideration, depending on such factors as the institution's place within the branch's hierarchy or its prestige and legitimacy during a certain historical moment. We must
indeed acknowledge that each branch of government is not a homogeneous entity, but rather consists of many bodies with a variety of functions, purposes, and customs. To illustrate, within the Judiciary, the
nature and extent of the duty to give sincere reasons may be influenced by inferior-superior court relationships.' 42 The form and content of judicial justifications depend on where a court finds itself
within a judicial hierarchy: a trial court versus an intermediate appel138. The "rational basis" standard of review was first used by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in
two 1938 opinions to characterize a new judicial deference to legislative decision making. See
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
139. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEREMINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 540 (3d ed. 2006) ("Under the

rational basis test ... the law will be upheld unless the challenger proves that the law does not
serve any conceivable legitimate purpose.").
140. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
141. Courts usually look only to the question of whether there is a satisfactory justification
and do not examine legislative motives. However, scholars have recently argued that courts are
increasingly willing to look at legislative purpose as well. See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of
Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784 (2008).
142. On the importance of such distinctions, see, for example, Oldfather, supra note 122.
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late court, and an appellate court versus a court of last resort. Higher
courts have jurisdiction to control the legality of the decisions of the
courts below them. Reason-giving is an efficient tool for supervision
within the judicial hierarchy. Accordingly, higher courts set the parameters for acceptable justificatory practices of lower courts. The argument could therefore be made that higher courts should be subject
to a heightened sincerity requirement, precisely by virtue of their privileged position in terms of guidance, setting precedents, and exposure
to the public. For one thing, superior courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, despite being differently situated in various political systems, retain an exemplary character as "deliberative institutions"
whose bases of legitimacy have to be established in reasons. 143 Within
each type of court, further distinctions can be drawn depending on the
type of case under consideration: is the case a simple private dispute
over private rights or rather a "public law" type of dispute that poten144
tially impacts a large group of non-parties?
The demand for sincerity within an institution might also vary
across time because of that institution's idiosyncratic evolution in
terms of prestige and legitimacy. A canonical example is that of the
U.S. Supreme Court's change of attitude towards collective opinion
writing. 14 5 The story is well-known: originally, Supreme Court justices
each wrote their own individual opinions, following the English practice of seriatim opinions. Chief Justice John Marshall put an end to
this custom and imposed a per curiam opinion policy, 46 in part because he believed that individual candor through sincere seriatim
opinions would undermine rather than further the Court's authority. 147 However, since the mid-1940s, there has been a dramatic in143. See

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM

231-40 (1993) (describing courts, and specifi-

cally supreme courts, as exemplary deliberative institutions in which public reasons and justifications are both expected and offered).
144. On the diverging functions of litigation as being either a medium for resolving "private"
disputes between private parties about private rights or, instead, a forum for the vindication of
"public" interests such as constitutional or statutory policies, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (1979).
145. On this evolution, see generally John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the
United States Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137 (1999); Laura Krugman Ray, The
Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrenceby the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
777 (1989); Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial
Disintegration,44 CORNELL L.Q. 186 (1959) (reviewing the history of separate opinions).
146. On per curiam opinions, see Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517 (2000); Stephen
L. Wasby et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76 JUDICATURE 29 (1992).
147. The first unanimous decision was Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801). During the next four
years after Talbot, the Court rendered forty-six unanimous decisions. On John Marshall's con-
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crease in concurring and dissenting opinions, and occasionally the

148
Court has almost reverted back to the days of seriatim opinions.

One explanation for this return is the fact that the Court is nowadays
so well-established and authoritative that it can allow itself not to
speak in one voice, thereby giving way to more sincerity and more
149
focus on Justices' full reasons.

B.

Contextual Sincerity Based on the Number of Decision Makers

The sincerity requirement varies based upon yet another parameter:
1 50
the number of public officials involved in the decision making.
Sincerity raises different issues at both the individual and the collective level. Roughly speaking, one should expect to see stricter sincer-

ity requirements for public officials who make decisions individually
than for those who decide as part of multimember panels. This means
that within the same institution, decisions may be subject to different
sincerity requirements, depending on the number of decision makers
1
involved. 15
ception of the Court, see JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 293
(1996).
148. On this evolution, see T.M. Henderson, from Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A
Theory of Dissent, 2007 Sup. CT. REV. 283.
149. For a similar comparative law analysis, see John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671 (2004) (showing that since the
mid-1970s, European constitutional courts have questioned the model of the unanimous unsigned opinion and discussed the possibility of allowing concurring and dissenting opinions in
light of their increasing popularity and legitimacy).
150. The importance of size has been noticed by Robert L. Rabin in Job Security and Due
Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 60, 78-79 n.68 (1976) (arguing that "it may be useful to distinguish large and small organizations"). For example, in Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976), a police officer was dismissed
from the Marion Police Department, despite the city manager and the police department's failure to provide a reasoned basis for removal at the time of the dismissal; the police department
consisted of only seventeen officers. In discussing this case, Rabin explains,
In such small organizations, a dismissal action frequently embroils the chief official in a
personal conflict with the grievant. As a result, it often becomes difficult to sort out
proper and improper reasons for the dismissal, making it less likely that the requirement of a reasoned explanation will be honored in good faith rather than in a merely
formal sense. In contrast, in a larger police department or other bureaucratic organization the decision to dismiss may have to be cleared through a personnel officer or a
chief administrator who has no personal dealings with the grievant.
Rabin, supra, at 78-79 n.68.
151. For instance, it has been suggested that judges should be subject to different sincerity
requirements depending on whether they are deciding cases on their own or as part of multimember panels. In the latter situation, judges need to accommodate their colleagues' views
concerning the case, and a requirement of full sincerity might hinder the decision-making process. See Idleman, supra note 35, at 1384-85; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 742-43. John Leubsdorf
goes as far as to argue that
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If at the individual level, one can differentiate relatively easily between a decision maker's normative and motivating reasons, the distinction becomes harder to draw when more than one decision maker
is involved. When the decision maker consists of a single person,
making the decision and providing reasons to justify the decision can
appropriately be regarded as separate processes. An important difference is that collective decision makers typically need to satisfy demands for collegiality and majority-building, while individuals do not.
When two or more officials make a collective decision, the justifying
reasons they agree upon as a group affect the substance of the decision. Because collective bodies must reach a common decision, decision makers must offer up their reasons for discussion so as to reach
and secure an agreement. 152 In the case of persistent divergence
among members, the justification ultimately endorsed by the institution as a whole is likely to result from negotiations, compromises, and
trade-offs, rather than rational agreement. In other words, multimember institutions may adopt a common set of reasons not because they
aim for truth, but because they aim for certain non-epistemic goals,
such as pleasing their colleagues, advancing their careers, or simply
wishing to end the discussion. The resulting "common" reasons rarely
reflect faithfully any individual member's actual reasons for or against
the decision.
Occasionally, a legal actor will deviate from her personal and sincere views about the law in order to secure the most desirable collective decision possible, given the views held by the other relevant
actors who share input into that final collective decision. For example,
one member might suppress her sincere view on a given legal issue if
she predicts a negative reaction by her colleagues. Alternatively, certain members may not be influenced by the collective discussion but
may nevertheless side with the rest of the body in the interest of expediency (or for some less avowable motive). It follows that the resulting decision, as well as its accompanying justification, is rarely that
153 If
which was initially favored by each individual decision maker.
collective decisions were governed by strict sincerity norms, few of
[tlo the extent that an opinion speaks for a number of judges with differing views, one
could say that to consider its purported author's sincerity becomes pointless. That author, like a courtroom advocate, speaks on behalf of others, or rather on behalf of a
consensus that goes beyond her own view.
See John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 488 (2001).
152. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1335, 1350 (1998) (defending judicial decision making as a principled enterprise and
showing that collegiality can lead to mutual influences that are positive).
153. See Shepsle, supra note 10, at 254. *
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them would pass an exhaustive motivational or even a partial motivational sincerity test because the public justifications provided can
hardly ever track each and every decision maker's motivating reasons.
This explains why certain forms of strategic behavior, 154 such as insincere voting to forge a majority coalition, appear to be almost univer155
sally accepted and routinely practiced.
The preceding analysis suggests that in a multimember context, because we usually only have access to the collective justification delivered by the institution as a whole, 156 ascertaining the decision makers'
motivating reasons becomes difficult if not impossible. For example,
as Justice Hugo Black has noted in the famous 1970s desegregation
case Palmer v. Thompson, which turned upon the question of whether
Mississippi legislators' decision to close public swimming pools had
been motivated by the goal of avoiding desegregation, it is "extremely
difficult," perhaps even impossible, "to determine the 'sole' or 'domi'1 5 7
nant' motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators.
One possible result is a mismatch between the actual reasons for
each decision maker's view of the matter and the reason publicly provided by the institution. The reasons given by a collective entity can
certainly be analyzed as the collective's justificatory reasons, but
whether they also reflect the entity's motivating reasons is debatable.15 8 We routinely ascribe motives to multimember institutions, but
it is controversial whether such bodies really have motives qua collective. 159 The reasons an institution publicly discloses may come apart
154. On strategic tactics on the bench, see generally WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDI(1964).
155. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999) (arguing that some forms of strategic behavior in multimember
courts, such as insincere voting to build a majority, are acceptable, while other forms, such as
misrepresenting one's position in a case in order to better advance one's preference or stark vote
trading across unrelated cases, are controversial).
156. Of course, courts are a considerable exception inasmuch as judges have the opportunity
to voice their disagreement by writing concurring and dissenting opinions.
157. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971).
158. For such an example, and the resulting controversy, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
For instance, Ronald Dworkin commented on the contentious decision as follows:
[T]here were two parts to the argument all five conservative justices endorsed. The
first part held that the Florida Supreme Court's recount order was unconstitutional
because it violated the equal protection clause, and the second that there was no time
left for the Florida court to correct its errors. Much of the initial fury that the decision
provoked was directed at the sheer implausibility and, indeed, hubris of the later part.
Ronald Dworkin, Introduction to A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION 7 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002)
(emphasis added).
159. Legislatures provide an interesting example of this phenomenon. Usually, only a few
members of the legislature explicitly state their objective for the enactment of a given statute
during the parliamentary debates or in the course of making public statements (for example, to
CIAL STRATEGY
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from the reasons that its members hold individually. Various members may have very different justificatory reasons for their decisions.' 60 In other words, members of an organization that has
officially given a reason need not themselves endorse that reason. In
light of this, the two most demanding versions of the motivational requirement-exhaustive motivational sincerity, which demands that
decision makers be motivated either by the very justificatory reasons
the institution gives, and partial motivational sincerity, which requires
that decision makers be motivated by some of these reasons they put
forward as justifications-seem rarely applicable to collective decision
makers. 161 In most situations, multimember organizations can only be
reasonably expected to abide by a counterfactual motivational requirement in the sense that they could counterfactually be motivated
by the reasons the institution gives.
To see more clearly why this is true, we should bear in mind that
collectives are curious epistemic subjects. They lack many of the attributes that are considered important in order for individual human
beings to be sincere about their decisions. For instance, they do not
have their own faculties of perception or memory, at least not in the
same sense as individuals have them. The question of whether we
should attribute mental or mental-like states, including beliefs and
pro-attitudes such as sincerity, to collectivities is an ongoing one in
contemporary social epistemology. 162 We need not settle the issue of
whether collectives are legitimate bearers of states such as beliefs, but
we should at least be aware that the conditions under which an indithe press). The problem is that these statements cannot be properly attributed to other legislators who have not made their views public. As Young notes, "In the cases of legislatures and
other large composite actors, the notion of motive as a real mental state of the collective is
obviously fictitious, a construct." Young, supra note 131, at 202.
160. A classical illustration of such disagreement on reasons can be found in the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which for the first time struck down
the death penalty under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Although the death penalty was struck down by a vote of five to four, there were five concurring
opinions: Justices Stewart, White, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall each concurred separately.
Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented jointly and separately.
161. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 742-43.
162. This debate is roughly composed of partisans and opponents of the so-called summative

account of group beliefs. Under the classical summative account, a group believes p if all-or at
least most-of the group members believe p. See Anthony Quinton, Social Objects, 76 PROC.

ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 1, 17 (1976). Under nonsummative accounts, it is sometimes possible for a
group to have beliefs that are not the mere sum of the beliefs held by its members. See MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 257-60 (1989) (emphasizing that there are situations in

which a group does not believe p even though most of the members of the group believe p); see
also RAIMO TuOMELA, THE IMPORTANCE OF Us 315-16 (1995) (arguing that a group believes p
if certain "operative members"-that is, those members entrusted with the task of determining
the views of the group-adopt p as the view of the group).
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vidual person is sincere about his reasons for acting or deciding in a
certain way are not always identical to those under which collective
entities can be considered sincere about their reasons.
As David Reidy has observed, imposing stricter requirements on
multimember decision makers would compromise institutional actors'
incentives to engage in majority-building processes and strategic behaviors. 16 3 Individual concessions and position switches are often necessary for multimember organizations to agree on common
justificatory reasons for their decisions. This means that a number of
decision makers, as members of the collective institution, will occasionally find themselves accountable for justificatory reasons that they
did not support and had perhaps even explicitly refused to endorse as
their motivating reasons at the decision-making stage. I doubt that we
would ipso facto want to say that these decision makers are insincere.
In other words, it is not necessarily insincere for a multimember institution to adopt a common justificatory reason for a decision, even
though that justification does not reflect some of its members' actual
motives.
C. A Roadmap For Further Contextualizing Sincerity
To conclude this context-oriented analysis, so far this final Part has
shown that discussing sincerity across the branches of government,
rather than focusing on judicial sincerity, is a necessary yet insufficient
enterprise. It is necessary because sincerity raises issues similar for all
state actors in charge of making decisions affecting the public. Yet it
is insufficient in that sincerity can at best only be understood superficially at a level of generality, considering that every legal institution
might call for a context-specific sincerity requirement.
That said, it would make little sense to focus the analysis too narrowly on a given governmental function, such as adjudication, considering that many of the factors likely to influence the need for sincerity
have to do with an institution's history, design, and decision-making
procedures. The appropriate scope of sincerity cannot always be predetermined in advance for a set of institutions or even for a single
institution because it might vary depending on historical and political
factors, as well as on the area of law under consideration. That said,
several correlations can be drawn among institutions that are traditionally considered dissimilar. State actors from different branches of
government might occasionally find themselves in positions that are
more analogous with respect to their duty to give sincere reasons than
163. See Reidy, supra note 118, at 60.
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decision makers working within the same branch of government. For
instance, low-level judges or street-level bureaucrats who must adjudicate claims are arguably in a more similar situation than, on the one
hand, low-level judges and Supreme Court justices and, on the other
hand, street-level bureaucrats and top federal executive officials.
The value of sincerity is largely a function of a series of contextual
variables.1 64 When evaluating the preferable form of sincerity to be
required from state actors, we should take into account different parameters, including at least (1) the outcome of the underlying decision; (2) the actors involved in the decision-making process; and (3)
the audience to whom state actors are addressing their explanations. I
will now briefly explain how these three different factors may bear on
the need for sincere reason-giving.
Whether the outcome of a legal decision is favorable or unfavorable
may influence the need for and the extent of sincere reason-giving.
Considering the outcomes entails assessing the consequences of a decision and asking questions, such as whether the decision is so trivial
that it does not matter if those who affected by it understand its motivational basis. Quite the contrary, if the outcome of the decision is
crucial in some way, reason-givers should be held to a higher standard.
The actors involved in the decision-making process matter a great
deal as well. Thus, the sincerity requirement should vary based not
only on whether the decision is made by multimember panels or by
single decision makers but also based on whether it is made by legal
professionals or by laypersons, in addition to other differentiating factors. For instance, in a case handled by alternative dispute resolution
methods such as arbitration, the arbiter is often chosen for her personal prestige and experience. She may not need to give sincere reasons-or even very superficial ones-precisely because her decision
was intended to result from a swift and authoritative appreciation of
the data rather than from a sincerely reasoned analysis.
The scope of sincerity may vary with the differing needs and expectations of one's audiences. State actors may give reasons for different
audiences, and they often do so for more than one audience at a time.
Reasons may be addressed to other public officials (be they immedi164. Sincerity does not differ from other forms of legal discourse in that it cannot be understood if solely apprehended in detachment but rather must be analyzed "in context" or situated
within a "contingent web of experience and location." See Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, in PRAGMATISM, LAW AND SOCIETY 275 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).

For a theoretical analysis of such a pragmatic approach, see Martha Minow & Elizabeth V.
Spelman, In Context, in PRAGMATISM, LAW AND SOCIETY 247 (Michael Brint & William Weaver
eds., 1991).
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ate colleagues or members of other institutions or other branches of
government), legal professionals (including lawyers, professors, and
law students), the public at large, or sometimes the very individuals
directly affected by the decision. The need for more or less sincere
reasons may differ depending on the characteristics of the recipient.
Everyone may not have an equal right to the same degree of sincerity.
Certain people, for instance because of the gravity of the situation or
because of personal characteristics such as education, language proficiency, and so on, may call for heightened sincere reason-giving.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this analysis is that, to a certain extent, whether
decision makers are sincere is relative to context. Sincerity is contextdependent in two main ways. First, whether decision makers are sincere depends on the type of reason-giving requirement in place: externalist or internalist. Second, certain features of context, such as the
institution's function within a given socio-legal system or its decisionmaking procedure, shape the standard that public officials must meet
in order for their reasons to count as sincere. Proponents of the
strong, internalist sincerity requirement require congruence between
actual motives and stated reasons. Proponents of the weak, externalist sincerity requirement only demand an articulation of sufficient reasons. Both positions have the advantage of offering clear-cut criteria
for assessing state actors' sincerity, but neither adequately reflects the
historical, social, and structural contexts that inform public institutions' justificatory practices. This Article recovers this crucial lost
context and, in the process, suggests that sincerity can be assessed differently according to a shifting framework, depending on the situation. This Article, however, merely purports to sketch a tentative
framework for a contextual and institutional analysis of sincerity in
the law. To a large extent, this contribution should be understood as
only the beginning and not the end of the critical task of constructing
the conceptual framework within which sincerity may be evaluated in
the law. More empirical research on actual reason-giving by public
institutions which takes into account the theoretical understandings
uncovered by this Article would be extremely helpful in further assessing how the sincerity requirement applies to real world instances
of reason-giving.

